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International trade can be a significant factor in the spread of diseases from one 
region of the world to another.  As such, efficacious international movement controls on 
potential disease spreading entities such as people, animals, plants or products from 
plants and animals is a critical component of good disease management.  Collectively, 
in international trade law these policies are known as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures.  Many of these controls are implemented based on national borders as they 
are convenient separators of government responsibility.  While governments have a 
legitimate obligation to prevent disease entry, spread and establishment in their country, 
they are also frequently pressured to utilize health regulations as disguised trade 
barriers to provide protection to their national producers from international competition 
(Kerr, 2004).  To prevent this, international efforts were undertaken to promote 
measures being applied only when there is a scientific justification.  One of the first 
steps taken was to create international expert bodies that could bring together technical 
expertise from around the world to form recommendations regarding what would 
constitute good scientific disease management practices.  These included, but were not 
limited to, disease-related trade restrictions.  Effective enforcement, however, was 
difficult as the international institutions involved lacked a binding dispute settlement 
mechanism (Kerr, 2004).   
 
As governments increasingly agreed to constrain their ability to utilize traditional 
protectionist measures, such as tariffs and quotas, through consecutive negotiating 
rounds at the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT), illegitimate barriers to 
trade, such as SPS measures being applied when not scientifically warranted, were 
seen as a rising problem in international trade relations.  Members decided to negotiate 
an agreement within the GATT, the precursor to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which would govern the use of SPS measures, allowing Members to enact them but 
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant health.  The significance 
of having an agreement on the application of SPS measures in the newly created WTO 
was that it would now be subject to the WTO’s binding dispute settlement procedures, 
forcing governments to abide by the rules agreed upon or face retaliation instead. 
 
In the negotiated agreement, one provision is that countries should be able to 
export from uninfected regions of their country if they could be effectively segregated 
from their infected counterparts.  This marked a departure from traditional approaches 
to SPS measures in which nation-wide bans from the infected country were the norm.  
Being able to export from non-infected regions can have significant economic benefit for 
a large exporting nation (such as Canada) that could easily experience a localized, 
controlled outbreak.  However, as accepting imports from sub-national areas is a novel 
approach to import management, practices and strategies to create regions with a 
distinct disease status, as well as administrative procedures to recognize these regions, 
are still the subject of negotiation.  Serious consideration of this issue has been taking 
place at the WTO for several years but little progress has been made.  Canada is also 
beginning to study how it could implement a domestic regionalization strategy in the 
event of a disease outbreak.  In addition to exploring why recognizing sub-national  
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disease regions can be beneficial, this paper models the economic implications of sub-
national disease regions for international trade and domestic policy and summarizes the 
debate at the WTO surrounding recognition by trading partners of these regions and 
reports on the steps Canada has taken to implement its international obligations. 
 
Canadian Agricultural Trade 
 
The Canadian agriculture sector is very trade dependent – while agriculture 
accounts for only about 2.2 percent of Canada’s GDP, it accounts for about ten percent 
of its total exports.  For example, in 2001, Canada’s net exports of products such as 
beef and pork were over 40 percent of total production (Serecon Management 
Consulting Group, 2002).  The United States is Canada’s most important trade partner 
as about 60 percent of agri-food exports are destined for the US market; other important 
markets include the EU, Japan, Mexico, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea and Brazil 
(Yeung et al., 2005).  Canada’s expanding export markets have provided significant 
benefits for the Canadian livestock industry, but it also carries with it considerable 
economic vulnerability.  The degree of this vulnerability was made abundantly clear in 
Canada when BSE was discovered in a Canadian cow.  Within days of the May 20
th, 
2003 announcement that a Canadian animal tested positive for BSE, 34 countries 
imposed complete or partial bans against imports of Canadian cattle and beef and the 
political process of having them lifted has been extremely slow and arduous.  The 
Canadian cattle industry experienced losses estimated at over $6 billion (CACH, 2004) 
and now recognizes the impact disease outbreaks can have on its ability to export and 
the dramatic effect on profitability.  The industry also realized the importance of 
international trade law in regulating the use of border measures and that stronger 
international rules could reduce the risks border measures can represent.  Although two 
of Canada’s most important markets are its NAFTA partners, the US and Mexico, 
improvements using NAFTA institutions are unlikely (Kerr, 2001) and, as a result, this 
paper focuses on initiatives that would take place in multilateral rule-making bodies. 
 
The SPS Agreement and International Disease Control 
 
During the negotiation of the Uruguay Round, parties to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) recognized the importance of creating rules to ensure 
trade barriers put in place to protect human, animal and plant health were not used as 
illegitimate barriers to trade.  The result was the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).  The SPS Agreement states 
Members can apply SPS measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health but 
only to the extent necessary as determined by scientific principles.  These measures 
must not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between WTO Members where identical 
or similar conditions exist, including compared to their own country.  The purpose is to 
prevent measures from being applied in a manner that constitutes a disguised 
restriction on international trade (WTO, 1994).   
 
The SPS Agreement does not dictate the sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures a country should apply but states that Members must follow international  
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scientific guidelines in drafting and implementing their import regulations.  The SPS 
recognizes three international standard setting bodies as the relevant international 
experts.
1  The SPS Agreement calls on countries to harmonize their SPS measures on 
“as wide a basis as possible” by basing them on international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations.  Members have the latitude to use the most efficacious policy 
instrument suitable for their situation when adhering to the international standards.   
Hence, the concept of “equivalence”, whereby members accept alternative approaches 
as providing the same level of protection, becomes of central importance.  
 
The SPS Agreement obligates countries to base their SPS measures on the risk 
posed and evaluate these based on available scientific evidence and the costs faced in 
the event of a disease outbreak.  When determining the appropriate level of protection 
that should be provided, Members are to include minimization of trade disruption as one 
objective.  A central provision of the Agreement states, “Members shall ensure that 
[SPS] measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical and economic 
feasibility” (Article 5, par 6, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures). 
 
Although controlling disease movement into a country is a laudable goal of 
national governments, border measures can also be captured by protectionist interests 
(Kerr, 2004).  While the most efficacious disease management approach would be 
based solely on the dynamics of the disease, divisions of government jurisdiction often 
means national borders are utilized extensively for disease management.  While 
national borders can be a convenient way to implement disease management protocols, 
they are often mere lines drawn on a map that do not correspond with a science-based 
disease management strategy
2.  In large, geographically diverse countries such as 
Canada, a particular disease outbreak may be confined to a very small area or be 
unable to survive in others
3 but countries have traditionally based their risk analysis for 
the purpose of creating import regulations on a country as a single geographic unit.  
This can result in significant economic costs without any increased efficiency in 
controlling the spread of a disease (Loppacher and Kerr, 2005).  This was recognized 
when the SPS Agreement was being drafted and provisions regarding evaluations 
based on sub-national areas were created. 
 
Regionalization in the SPS Agreement 
 
In recognition that national boundaries may be inappropriate devices to manage 
the spread of disease and that diseases may be localized to sub-national areas, 
                                                 
1 The international standard setting bodies are the Codex Alimentarius Commission for standards related 
to human health, the World Animal Health Organization (originally known as the Office International des 
Epizooties or OIE) for standards related to animal health and diseases, and the International Plant 
Protection Convention (IPPC) for standards related to plant health and diseases.   
2 International boundaries may have an impact on disease spread if it corresponded to a natural barrier 
such as a mountain range which constrain animal movement or a very large body of water such as an 
ocean.  This is not the case with the border, for example, between Canada and the US. 
3 For example, there may be areas of cold climate where disease bearing pests cannot survive.  
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countries agreed to include the concept of ‘regionalization’ in the SPS Agreement.   
Regionalization allows countries to have a different disease status for different areas 
within their borders.  Thus, if an outbreak occurs in a country and it can be controlled 
and localized to specific areas, constraints on international trade need only apply to 
products originating from the actual area(s) affected rather than the entire country.  This 
is enshrined in Article 6: Adaptation to Regional Conditions, Including Pest- or Disease-
Free Areas and Areas of Low Pest or Disease Prevalence.  Article 6 states that 
Members are to adapt their SPS measures to the conditions of the exporting area, 
whether it is part or all of a single country or several countries.  These areas should be 
evaluated based on the prevalence of diseases or pests, the eradication and control 
programmes present and the criteria and recommendations from relevant international 
organizations.  Areas can be defined based on geography, ecosystems, epidemiological 
surveillance and effectiveness of SPS controls.  Exporting members have the obligation 
to provide necessary evidence to support claims of the disease status of an area, and 
demonstrate that they are likely to remain disease-free or have low disease prevalence. 
 
The concept of regionalization was included in the SPS Agreement because of 
the significant economic benefits that could be gained from its application.  After a 
disease outbreak, when exports are restricted from only a small area of the country 
rather than the whole, welfare gains from trade are not completely eliminated, although 
they will likely be reduced.  Both producers in the exporting country and consumers in 
the importing country are better off. 
 
Economic Analysis of Applying Regionalization 
 
The economic effects of allowing sub-national regions of exporting countries to 
be designated as having a sufficiently low probability of a disease outbreak or 
occurrence that trade partners will accept imports from the region can be illustrated 
using a multiple market, partial equilibrium model.  In Figure 1, the market in the 
Exporting Country is divided between an area where a disease outbreak has occurred 
in Panel A (“Infected Area”) and an area where a disease outbreak has not transpired in 
Panel B (“Non-Infected Area”).  For the moment it is assumed that the Infected Area is 
determined by veterinary criteria and not by pre-existing sub-national administrative 
units, such as provinces or states, in the Exporting Country.  This assumption will be 
dealt with in some detail in subsequent discussions. Prior to a disease outbreak, both 
the Infected Area and the Non-Infected Area are export competitive in the international 
market.  Panel C depicts the “Rest of the World” which has trade relations with the 
Exporting Country.
4 This model does not take into account the added complexity of 
multi-product exports
5, or capacity constraints that may arise in the exporting country 
when borders are closed.
6   
 
                                                 
4 All countries in the “Rest of the World” are assumed to have the same sanitary or phytosanitary regime 
for the product in question and, thus, in this sense can be treated as a single market.  
5 Such as exports of live animals and meat. 
6 Such as capacity to slaughter animals that can no longer be traded.  
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In the absence of imports from the Exporting Country, supply in the Rest of the 
World is depicted as Srow in Figure 1.  Demand in the Rest of the World is Drow. If 
products are available to the Rest of the World at any price lower than P1, it will be 
willing to import as long as products entering its customs territory comply with its 
sanitary or phytosanitary regulations.  At any price above P2 in the Exporting Country, 
product will be offered for export.    
 
As P1 and P2 diverge, there is an opportunity for trade between the Exporting 
Country and the Rest of the World.  In the Panel C of Figure 1, ST denotes the total 
supply in the Rest of the World when trade with the Exporting Country is not restricted. 
ST is comprised of domestically produced products originating in the Rest of the World, 
Srow, to which imports are added.  Thus, the market clears in the Rest of the World 
where ST equals Drow. The price in the Rest of the World and the Exporting Country is 
P0.
7  Total consumption in the Rest of the World is Qrow
5 – which is comprised of Qrow
1 
produced domestically and imports of Qrow
5 minus Qrow
1.  Prior to a disease outbreak, 
imports originate in both areas of the Exporting Country.  This is depicted in Panel C 
where, at any price imports from the Non-Infected are equal to the horizontal distance 
between Srow and Srow+Snia.  Similarly, imports from the (not yet) Infected Area are equal 
to the horizontal distance between Srow+Snia and ST.  Hence, at P0 imports from the 
Non-Infected area are equal to Qrow
3 minus Qrow
1 (and equal to Qnia
2 minus Qnia
1 of 
exports in Panel B), while imports from the (not yet) Infected Area are equal to Qrow
5 
minus Qrow
3 (and equal to Qia
2 minus Qia
1 of exports in Panel A). 
 
In the period prior to a disease outbreak, the Exporting Country's total welfare is 
the sum of the welfare in its two areas.  The producer surplus in the (not yet) Infected 
Area is gg + cc + y + dd + w + ee and the consumer surplus is ff + v.  In the Non-
Infected Area the producer surplus is p + hh + m + n + o and the consumer is j + k 
(giving a total welfare in the Exporting Country of gg + cc + y + dd + w + ee + ff + v + p 
+ hh + m + n + o + j + k). 
 
Now, assume that an outbreak of a disease occurs in the Infected Area and not 
in the Non-Infected Area.  For the moment, assume that this disease is not directly 
harmful to human health
8 but the tradable product will act as a vector for the disease 
creating a risk of transfer to other areas that are disease-free, either domestic or 
foreign.  As a result, importers in the Rest of the World are allowed to embargo imports 
under the WTO SPS Agreement. 
                                                 
7 Transportation and transaction costs are assumed to be sufficiently small to be ignored. 
8 Or that the risk to humans can be reduced to acceptable levels through relatively low cost procedures. 
An example might be the removal of “specified risk materials” such as the brain and spinal cord among 
others in the case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Foot and mouth disease is an example 
of a disease where the risk to humans is minimal but most tradable products represent a risk to animals in 
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If sub-national regions cannot be designated as disease-free then all imports 
from the Exporting Country will be embargoed whether they originate in the Infected 
Area or not.  As a result, both areas of the Exporting Country move to their autarky 
equilibrium with price declining to P2.
9  In the Infected Area there is a decline in 
producer surplus from gg + cc + y + dd + w + ee to gg + cc + y and an increase in 
consumer surplus from ff + v to ff + v + dd + w.  The net loss in welfare in the Infected 
Area is ee. In the Non-Infected Area, producer surplus declines from p + hh + m + n + o 
to p + hh.  There is an increase in consumer surplus from j + k to j + k+ m + n.  As a 
result, the net loss in welfare in the Non-Infected Area is equal to area o.  The welfare 
loss to the Exporting Country arising from the disease outbreak and the resultant trade 
embargo is o + ee. 
 
It is important to point out that if the Exporting Country wishes to compensate its 
producers, there is no “incentive-based” reason for a particular policy design.  The 
Exporting Country can choose to compensate its producers in ways that do not distort 
markets – for example, direct transfers to support producers’ income.  If the Exporting 
Country chooses to support its producers in other ways, by supporting the price for 
example, it will be of no consequence from the trade perspective or the domestic 
management of the disease.  As will become clear, when the case of sub-regional areas 
being allowed to export is discussed, there are important incentive considerations that 
will have to be considered in domestic policy design in the Exporting Country. 
 
In the case of the import embargo, the effect on the Rest of the World can also 
be observed.  If imports are embargoed, the Rest of the World moves to a situation of 
autarky.  Price increases to P1 and there is a decrease in consumer surplus of a + b + c 
and increase in producer surplus of d + a.
10 
 
Now assume that sub-national regions can be declared disease-free when there 
is a geographically limited disease outbreak in the Exporting Country.  Also assume, for 
the moment, that domestic policy initiatives in the Exporting Country can contain the 
disease within the Infected Area to the satisfaction of authorities in the Rest of the World 
and, thus they will be willing to allow imports of product originating in the Non-Infected 
Area.  In addition, also assume that the Infected Area can be isolated at no additional 
budgetary cost. 
                                                 
9 The analysis has been deliberately simplified by having the autarchy price be the same in both the 
Infected Area and the Non-Infected Area. This means that there is no incentive for product to move 
between the two areas of the country. This simplification is made so that the international effects can be 
concentrated upon – there is no domestic policy question relating to putting measures in place 
domestically to prevent the movement of products from the infected area to the non-infected area. As 
depicted there is no economic incentive to move products between the two areas of the country. This 
simplification does not materially alter the results as far as the trade effects and trade policy are 
concerned but it simplifies the exposition considerably. The Exporting Country may still wish to put in 
place policies to contain the disease within the Infected Area for domestic policy reasons but exports from 
the entire country will still be embargoed. 
10 This was the gain that some American producers expected from the closure of the US market to 
Canadian product as a result of BSE and why organizations such as R-CALF were so tenacious in their 
attempts to prevent the border from re-opening. For a discussion of the North American BSE case see 
(Loppacher and Kerr, 2005).  
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Imports from the Infected Area are no longer allowed into the Rest of the World 
market.  As a result the supply curve in the Rest of the World will shift from ST to 
Srow+Snia, price in the Rest of the World increases to P3, which becomes the price 
received by producers in the Non-Infected Area.  The Infected Area would move to its 
autarky position with price declining to P2.  There would be an increase in producer 
surplus equal to k + l in the Non-Infected Area which is partially offset by a decline in 
consumer surplus equal to k, leading to a net increase in welfare of l.   A s  i n  t h e  
previous case, welfare declines by ee in the Infected Area.  Again, producers suffer a 
decline in surplus equal to dd + w + ee. 
 
In the Rest of the World, producer surplus increases by d while consumer 
surplus declines by d + e + f + g + h, yielding a welfare decrease of e + f + g + h.  
When this is compared to the case where no sub-national regions are allowed, it is easy 
to see why producers in the Rest of the World will work against allowing sub-national 
regions to export – they forgo producer surplus equal to a.
11 
 
It is now necessary to return to the assumption that isolation of the Infected 
Areas is costless, or at least can be accomplished without significant increases in 
monitoring and enforcement costs.  This assumption is unrealistic due to the incentives 
that are created to smuggle product from the Infected Area to the Non-Infected Area.  
With the Non-Affected Area allowed to export, there is a price differential equal to P3 
minus P2 between the Infected Area and the Non-Infected Area.  Therefore, if producers 
in the Infected Area can move and sell their product in the Non-Infected Area, they can 
obtain the premium associated with P3.
12  While smuggling
13 may take additional 
resources to avoid detection, smuggling costs can increase costs for producers in the 
Infected Area by anything up to the difference between P3 and P2 and smuggling will be 
profitable.  It could be argued that increased enforcement of internal restriction on the 
movement of product could eradicate smuggling, but economic studies of smuggling 
suggest that its total elimination is seldom possible – the usual optimizing result is some 
positive level of smuggling (Saba et al., 1995).  In this case, however, smuggling must 
be totally eliminated because the movement of even one unit of the infected product 
could potentially be enough to lead to the infection of the disease-free area, leading to a 
loss in the ability to export.  The result would be to move to the case where sub-national 
                                                 
11 The SPS rules also allow temporary embargoes on a national level until the policy initiatives in the 
Exporting Country can be assessed as to their efficacy. Producers in importing countries, hence, initially 
gain area a and well as d but will lose a once exports can resume from the Non-Infected Area. They have 
an incentive to lobby for delay. This may explain why it often takes a long time for sub-regional areas to 
regain their “fit to export” status from importers when there are lapses in sub-regional areas. See Kerr et 
al., (2005) for a discussion of the issues associated with delaying the opening of borders in the wake of a 
disease outbreak. 
12 Note, there is no need for producers to be the smugglers. If there is an arbitrage opportunity 
independent smugglers could buy product at the low price in the Infected Area and smuggle the product 
to the Non-Infected Area to sell at the high price. As long as they can offer producers P2 or higher 
smuggling can be expected. For convenience we assume that producers in the Infected Area engage in 
smuggling. 
13 We will define smuggling as the movement of product contrary to some specified rules prohibiting such 
movement. This is a very broad definition and means smuggling is any kind of movement of product that 
should not be occurring, whether or not this is done for financial gain from arbitraging markets.  
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exporting regions are not allowed – the total embargo of imports by the Rest of the 
World.  The alternative is to design policies to remove the incentive to engage in 
smuggling. 
 
Removing the incentive to smuggle requires the prices in the Infected Area and 
the Non-Infected Area to be equalized, which can be accomplished through a deficiency 
payment policy.  The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations’ 
Animal Health Manual for the Preparation of Foot-and-Mouth Disease
14 Contingency 
Plans states:  
 
Failure to pay adequate and timely compensation will seriously 
compromise [foot and mouth disease] eradication campaigns by 
causing resentment in communities and a lack of cooperation 
and will act as a spur for the illegal smuggling and clandestine 
sale of animals from infected areas to avoid losses (FAO, 2002). 
   
The policy would have to guarantee producers in the Infected Area price P3, resulting in 
a production output increase from Qia
2 to Qia
3.  Failure to allow producers in the infected 
area to increase output to the point where marginal cost equals price, perhaps by tying 
compensation to historic levels of output, or introducing a quota on eligibility for the 
subsidy to reduce payments and output in the Infected Area, would still provide an 
incentive for smuggling because the marginal cost of producing the additional output 
would be less than the price received when product is smuggled into the Non-Infected 
Area.  Given that only small quantities being smuggled are sufficient to cause the loss in 
exporting status, it would seem unwise not to allow P3 to apply to all of the product that 
producers within the Infected Area wish to supply.
15  Some resources would be required 
for monitoring and enforcement of the ban on product movements to prevent mistakes, 
but these would likely be small in the absence of an economic incentive to smuggle.  
 
It would seem that the price paid to producers in the Infected Area should be 
directly tied to daily market prices in the Non-Infected Area and paid on the basis of the 
day producers choose to market.  Payments calculated using average prices or some 
other criteria are likely to lead to perceptions that individual producers may be able to 
take advantage of arbitrage opportunities through smuggling.
16  Of course, if prices in 
the Infected Area are set higher than those in the Non-Infected Area, product will be 
moved from the Non-Infected Area to the Infected Area to take advantage of the higher 
returns being guaranteed by the government.  Such movements will increase the 
                                                 
14 Foot and Mouth disease is a highly contagious disease with significant costs associated with an 
outbreak.  This disease in particular will be dealt with in much greater detail later in the paper.  
15 The government in the exporting country would have to be sure that P3 minus the smuggling cost (SC) 
is less than the marginal cost for every infra-marginal animal to ensure that smuggling would not take 
place. As the government is unlikely to know the smuggling cost with any accuracy this seems a risky 
strategy. Further, producers may not know their smuggling costs ex ante leading to experimentation with 
smuggling until the true costs become known. Even if the smuggling activity proves to be unprofitable, if 
the smuggling is successful in moving product to the Non-Infected market, its export status may be lost. 
16 This is similar to the feeling by some producers that individually they would be able to do better 
marketing privately than if they receive a pooled price from the Canadian Wheat Board.  
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budgetary cost of the deficiency payment.  Getting the price regime “right” will be central 
to the success of a strategy aimed at expediting sub-national exports. 
 
If the government guarantees producers in the Infected Area price P3, Qia
3 will be 
produced.  Producers in the Infected Area will gain v + u while consumers will lose 
surplus equal to v.  If Qia
3 is supplied, the market clearing price is P4.  Thus, the cost of 
the government program is the rectangle defined by (P3-P4) x Qia
3 or v + u + q + dd + w 
+ ee + x + r + cc + aa + y + z + bb + s + t.
17  This subsidy is required to allow the 
wishes of WTO Members, as expressed in the SPS, that exports take place from 
disease-free areas to be achieved.  Hence, subsidies provided for this purpose should 
be considered non-actionable (receive Green Box status) even if they are coupled. 
 
This compensation policy produces a welfare loss of x + r + q + bb + s in the 
Infected Area.
18  Having the policy accomplish its objective, however, leads to a welfare 
gain of l in the Non-Infected market.  The net welfare change in the Exporting Country 
therefore becomes ─(x + r + q + bb + s) + l.  It may well be that ─(x + r + q + bb + s) + 
l is negative and larger than ee + o, which is the welfare loss associated with not 
choosing to move to a system of regional exporting.  Hence, it is not unambiguously 
welfare enhancing for an exporting government to support, or choose, a policy whereby 
sub-regions can export. Of course, it is well known that governments may not make 
policy based on maximization of social welfare as defined by economists.  If 
governments are interested in minimizing the budgetary cost of a policy then the 
deficiency payment for the Infected Area plus the enforcement costs associated with 
restricting the movement of product may be expensive compared to the type of 
compensation that might have to be paid to producers in both the Infected Area and the 
Non-Infected Area when imports from the entire country are embargoed.  Of course 
these are both empirical questions that require further investigation. 
 
It does seem clear, however, that the smaller the Infected Area relative to the 
national market, the smaller will be the relative welfare or budgetary cost of sub-national 
exports.  This is for two reasons, the obvious one being that the smaller the market in 
the infected area, the lower the welfare cost in that market.  Second, the less exports 
are disrupted, the smaller will be the increase in price above P0 (i.e. P3-P0 will be 
smaller) reducing the size of q + r + s 
19 in the case of welfare and the budgetary cost 
(because the rectangle defined by (P3-P4) x Qia
3 will be smaller
20. 
 
                                                 
17 If there is an adverse consumer reaction to products that are infected either because consumers are 
poorly informed or because the risk preferences of some consumers exhibit a lower tolerance than those 
deemed acceptable by the government, then demand curve Dia will shift to the left, the price consumers 
are willing to pay will fall below P4 and the cost of the subsidy will increase. In the United Kingdom there 
was an adverse consumer reaction when BSE in beef was linked to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob (vCJD), its 
human disease counterpart. 
18 This is because for any production beyond the autarky equilibrium in the Infected Area the cost of 
producing the extra unit of output (as seen on the supply curve) exceeds its value to consumers (as seen 
on the demand curve.  
19 Of course the welfare gain in the Non-Infected Area, l, will also be smaller. 
20 Note, not only will P3 be lower but P4 will be higher as Qia3 moves closer to Qia2.  
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This result suggests that the policy for controlling the movement of product from 
the Infected Area to the Non-Infected Area should be premised on science-based 
disease control criteria and not on pre-existing administrative units, sub-national political 
jurisdictions (i.e. states or provinces) or geographically strategic points.  It would only be 
coincidence that an area defined by science-based segregation criteria would coincide 
with an arbitrary geographic jurisdiction
21.  Hence, not using science-based criteria will 
always lead to an overly large area being selected for segregation and too much 
product being removed from the export market – thus increasing both the welfare cost 
and the budgetary cost of pursuing a policy of sub-national exports.  If, as suggested 
above, a successful policy must be based on removing the incentive to smuggle rather 
than efforts to control smuggling, the major budgetary cost will be associated with the 
deficiency payment, and while some monitoring and enforcement will be necessary to 
prevent mistakes being made, they can be put in place on an ad hoc basis.  A strong 
case for that there would be cost-reducing efficiencies associated with pre-existing 
administrative or geographically convenient areas would have to be made if they are to 
be given preference over science-based segregation. 
 
If the product is directly dangerous to humans then it would have to be withdrawn 
from the market.  Government will have to acquire the product and destroy it.  This is 
likely to be a short run problem as once a production cycle is finished the government 
would be able to ban production until the disease has run its course or effective 
measures are put in place.  If sub-national markets are not allowed to export the 
domestic supply (and exports) disappear from Figure 1, domestic demand in the 
(previously) Exporting Country will have to be supplied from the Rest of the World.   
Price in all three markets would be higher than P1. 
 
If exports are allowed from sub-national disease-free areas, supply in the 
Infected Area, Sia, will have to be removed from the market (and no longer exported) 
and demand in the Infected Area supplied from the Non-Infected Area
22.  In this case, 
as Sia is entirely removed from the market, the price will rise higher than P3.  As with the 
previous case, it is important that the incentive to smuggle is eliminated for product that 
is already in the production cycle.  The price at which the government buys hazardous 
products for removal from the market must compensate producers to an equal degree 
as that being received by those in the Non-Infected Area. 
 
Once the production cycle is finished in the Infected Area, no production should 
take place until the disease has run its course or has been eliminated. It should be 
easier to enforce a total production ban than to enforce a prohibition on the diversion of 
existing livestock to non-infected areas. The compensation that would have to be paid 
would only have to equal the producer surplus they are foregoing by not producing. 
 
The policy for this period needs to be designed so that producers do not have an 
incentive to covertly produce and smuggle product to the Non-Infected Area.  Providing 
                                                 
21 See Kerr (2004) for a discussion of arbitrary administrative boundaries and disease control 
22 Or possibly, in part, from the Rest of the World if the surplus available in the Non-Infected area is not 
sufficient to satisfy demand in the Infected Area at the three market equilibrium price.  
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producers with offsetting income will not likely be sufficient to eliminate the incentive to 
covertly produce and smuggle – the producer’s plant, equipment, and other investments 
will be there and idle.  If covert production and smuggling can be profitably engaged in, 
this will be extra income for the producer beyond what can be earned from the 
government provided income support and, therefore, the incentive remains.  One option 
would be to increase enforcement effort and penalties.  The decision to engage in 
covert production and smuggling will be determined by the relative returns from those 
activities, RSm, compared to the probability of detection ρ (ρ ≤ 1) and the penalty cost 
Pc.  Hence, covert production and smuggling will only be engaged in if RSm ≥ ρ x Pc.  
Increasing the resources dedicated to detection and enforcement can also increase the 
value of ρ and penalties can be made very high but, again, it can only take a small 
inflow of smuggled material for the Non-Infected Area to lose its export status.
23 
 
In certain cases, a policy that needs to be seriously considered as an alternative 
is for the government to allow production to take place and then pay producers the price 
received in the Non-Infected Area and take possession of the product to destroy it.  The 
incentive to engage in covert production and smuggling is therefore eliminated.  This 
policy option would entail a budgetary cost greater than P3 x Qia
3  24 in Figure 1 in 
addition to disposal costs.  Of course, the desirability of this policy option
25 will depend 
on the relative size of the Non-Infected Area to the Infected Area.  If the infected area is 
small, the cost might be less than those associated with a vigorous enforcement 
strategy. This bolsters the case for science-based rules for market segregation as the 
smaller the Infected Area, the lower the subsidy and disposal costs. 
 
Improving Disease Management Utilizing Regionalization 
 
Applying the concept of regionalization also has economic welfare implications 
because of the impact on incentives for the industry to undertake certain disease 
management practices.  After the severe economic losses following the discovery of 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada, the industry began to speculate 
that they would have been better off had the disease been covered up.  Alberta’s 
Premier Ralph Klein stated, “I guess any self-respecting rancher would have shot, 
shovelled and shut up, but he didn’t do that” (as reported by CBC, 2003).  While the 
frustrations that leads to this attitude towards the management of diseases is 
understandable, the problem with this type of approach is that, contrary to Premier 
Klein, risk communication is an absolutely critical component to the efficient 
management of risks.  For example, additional safeguards can be put in place to 
prevent the disease spreading in the plant or animal population and to prevent its 
spread to humans.  If producers conceal a disease outbreak because of the economic 
impacts, valuable opportunities for proper management of the disease may be missed.   
                                                 
23 While it might seem that eliminating covert production and smuggling would be relatively easy, the 
experience in attempting to control marijuana “grow operations” and cross border movements of product 
might provide some insights into the efficacy of such efforts.  
24 Remember the price in this case will be higher than P3 and the quantity produced will also be greater 
than Qia
3 as a result. There is also no revenue arising from sales to consumers in this case (i.e. revenues 
similar to P4 x Qia
3 do not accrue to producers and must be provided through the subsidy)  
25 Which will certainly be see as being “wasteful” by some critics.  
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When facing the threat of market disruption and significant economic losses from 
international applications of SPS measures after the discovery of a disease in the 
national herd, exporters must make a strategic decision.  The exporter can chose an 
‘honest’ strategy and reveal the presence of the disease, likely resulting in “temporary”
26 
trade disruptions until disease-free status can be regained
27.  In addition, if the importing 
country believes the exporting country has the proper incentives and safeguards in 
place to protect human and animal health, they are more likely to ban only the animals, 
meat and by-products that pose a risk of spreading the disease
28.  Proper management 
of the disease will likely mean domestic consumers retain their confidence in the 
institutions put in place to protect them and will not lose confidence in their domestic 
food supply, leaving domestic demand unaffected.  Instead, the exporter could choose a 
‘cheat’ strategy and attempt to conceal the outbreak.   If the exporter chooses this route, 
the impact on producer welfare in the country will depend on whether or not the 
‘cheating’ is discovered and if the disease spreads.  If it is not discovered, producer 
surplus will be maximized as there will be no adverse trade effect.  If, however, the 
cheating is discovered, major and long term border closures will likely result.  Importing 
countries will lose confidence in the veterinary service of the exporting country and even 
after the disease outbreak is brought under control, importers will be less likely to trust 
that the disease is in fact eradicated.  Hence, it will likely take a much longer time to 
reopen the border because trust will have to be re-established first.  In addition, 
domestic consumers may lose confidence in the safety of the domestic food supply so 
domestic demand could decrease, further depressing prices.  Regardless of whether 
the cheating is detected or not, sizeable economic losses could occur to both the 
exporting and importing countries if it results in the unchecked spread of the disease.   
 
The actions of the exporter will depend on several factors.  Firstly, as the 
probability of cheating being detected increases, the incentive to do so will decrease.  
Secondly, as the possibility of disease spread and the economic losses associated with 
disease spread increases, again, the incentive to conceal the disease will decrease.  
Finally, the decision of the exporter will depend on how the producer surplus in each 
outcome changes.  As shown above, if regionalization can be used, the decrease in 
producer surplus after the discovery of a disease in the domestic herd may well be 
smaller than if exports from the entire country are affected.  The smaller the ‘temporary 
and moderate’ expected trade disruption is after the announcement of a disease, the 
less likely it is that the exporter will risk facing the long term, severe trade effect 
                                                 
26 The amount of time that must pass before market access can be expected to be restored varies widely 
depending on the characteristics of the disease.  For example, a country can regain disease-free status 
with respect to rinderpest after 21 days without an outbreak if it employs ‘stamping out’ practices but it 
takes seven years without a case of BSE to be considered BSE free (CFIA, 2003). 
27 Even if country does not have disease-free status with respect to a particular disease, the animals 
affected and their meat and by-products may be able to be exported.  Conditions, however, are usually 
imposed and these conditions will not be removed until disease-free status is regained.   
28 For example in the BSE case, many countries banned all exports of live cattle and beef following 
Canada’s announcement even though some products carry almost no risk of spreading the disease.  The 
excellent relationship Canada has with the US allowed Canada to resume exports of boneless meat in 




combined with decreased domestic demand and increased possibility of disease 
spread.  Thus, the incentive to conceal a disease outbreak is lessened through 
regionalization.   The issue of the incentive to cover up the existence of a disease 
outbreak is modeled more formally in Appendix A. 
 
The ability of a country to regionalize and be allowed to resume exports from 
certain areas of the country will also impact the decisions a country makes after a 
disease outbreak.  Countries will often undertake better disease management practices 
to eradicate a disease in a particular area in order to regain export status.  When this 
strategy is successful, it encourages the expansion of the disease-free areas.   
Eventually, this may lead to the complete eradication of the disease within the country 
which may not have been feasible if it was necessary to eradicate the disease nation-
wide before exports could resume.  This strategy has been used extensively in South 
America in the fight against foot and mouth disease (FMD).  For example, Brazil first 
obtained recognition of an FMD free zone in 1998 and has continually expanded these 
regions which now account for 50 percent of the national territory, 75 percent of all 
bovine farms and 84 percent of the bovine population in the country.  This has allowed 
strong export growth, fuelling the expansion of the industry which is now the second 
largest producer in the world (second only to the US).  This would not have been 
possible if complete eradication was necessary before exports could resume and had 
led to significantly lower disease prevalence in the country overall (WTO, 2005a).  For 
more details on Brazil’s experience, see Appendix B. 
 
Work at the WTO SPS Committee 
 
The implementation of Article 6 was identified by the Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee) as an issue that required further work during 
the First Review of the SPS Agreement in 1999 and it has been an agenda item of 
every single meeting of the Committee of the WTO since 2003.  While all countries are 
officially supportive of the basic principles of creating sub-national zones in a country 
according to the disease status of the area, exporting countries often experience great 
difficulty in getting sub-national zones recognized by trading partners.  Discussions on 
regionalization have centred on this topic.  In the 1999 review, the SPS Committee 
noted that Members faced difficulties with implementing the Article on regionalization 
(WTO, 2004i).  Some of the issues that caused difficulty for Members included 
excessively lengthy administrative processes for the official recognition of a region from 
which exports would be accepted by importing countries, divergences in interpretation 
and implementation of international guidelines, and the complexities involved in risk 
assessment.  Discussion of these problems appears to have resolved little.  The 
Second Review of the SPS Agreement stated that exporting countries still suffered from 
delayed recognition of their pest or disease-free status by importing countries and that 
procedural issues remained a major impediment (WTO, 2005d).  It is difficult to discern 
if the problems in obtaining recognition relate to protectionist rent seeking by producers 
in importing nations (i.e. the potential loss of area a in Figure 1 if there is a disease 
outbreak in a foreign supplier’s territory) or worries about the efficacy of measures put in 
place to isolate the disease. Given that the SPS and the Codex, World Animal Health  
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Organization, and the IPPC are science-oriented, they have not dealt with the problem 
from an incentives perspective, instead, they focus on monitoring and control measures. 
Therefore, importing countries may be wise in their caution.  
 
Member’s Experience with Regionalization 
 
Members were called on to submit documents to the SPS Committee outlining 
some of their experiences with regionalization in an effort to encourage transparency 
and allow countries to learn from others’ experiences.  The majority of the submissions 
came from the European Union and Southern American countries.  A short summary is 
provided below and more detail is provided in Appendix B. 
European Union Submissions 
 
Regionalization is an important risk management tool utilized in the EU.  Disease 
status varies significantly among EU Members due to different ecological conditions, 
geographic barriers, and historical disease control mechanisms.  As there are no border 
controls after the completion of the Internal Market in 1992, regionalization is used 
extensively as both a disease management tool and to facilitate exports.  In the case of 
animal diseases, the EU applies this concept for FMD, classical swine fever, avian 
influenza, Aujeszky’s disease, and Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis (IBR) (WTO, 
2003j).  When conducting risk assessments to determine the appropriate SPS 
measures to employ, the primary element taken into consideration is the competency of 
the certifying authority involved (WTO, 1998).  Regionalization was an important control 
technique in the FMD epidemic in 2001, proving to be a successful strategy which 
allowed them to control the spread of the disease and safely resume trade more quickly, 
both within and outside of the EU (WTO, 2003j).  The EU raised a number of cases in 
which they feel they should be granted recognition for disease-free areas for diseases 
such as avian flu, classical swine fever, and FMD, but have not (WTO, 2005e).  They 
also highlight the numerous cases of recognizing others’ efforts at regionalization to 
emphasize the importance of reciprocity in recognition efforts (WTO, 2003j).   
 
South American Submissions 
 
The most significant plant or animal health problem faced by South American 
countries, including Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru and Chile is FMD.   
These countries have all applied regionalization to control and attempt to eradicate this 
disease, at least from certain areas of the country.  Various approaches have been 
utilized such as numerous control points strategically located according to 
epidemiological status of zones, vaccination within certain areas, large buffer areas 
between infected and disease-free zones, official quarantines, creating information 
systems for better control and animal movement controls.  Regionalization has proved 
to be a very effective disease management tool and regaining access to foreign markets 
was frequently cited as the most important incentive for implementing the programs.  
Complete eradication remains the goal for each of the national governments but it has 
thus far has proved unattainable, partially due to recurring outbreaks in neighbouring 
countries.    
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While these countries have had success in obtaining recognition for their FMD-
free areas, complaints have also been raised regarding areas that have not been 
recognized or import measures that are felt to be too restrictive.  For example, Brazil 
noted that while they have a large proportion of their cattle population recognized as 
FMD-free, only two of the seven major bovine fresh meat importers buy from them
29.  In 
addition, even the two countries that are open to Brazilian fresh meat exports apply 
trade restrictions related to FMD.  In their submission, Brazil states, “one can draw the 
conclusion that the most important restriction for Brazil’s exports of fresh bovine meat is 
still the lack of recognition of Brazil’s FMD-free zones, established in accordance with 
OIE standards” (WTO, 2005a). 
 
Another illustrative example of the problems exporters often face when 
attempting to obtain recognition of disease or pest free areas was provided by 
Argentina.  Argentina declared provinces in Northwest Argentina as free from citrus 
canker, a plant pest.  Argentina entered negotiations with one WTO Member (which was 
not identified) to obtain recognition of the different status for the disease-free region 
versus the region affected by the disease.  This Member has modified its import 
requirements twice but always recognized the different status of the regions concerned 
and did not disrupt the flow of goods.  However, with a different unidentified Member, 
Argentina was not able to export, despite efforts beginning in 1995.  In 1999 the 
Member recognized Northwest Argentina as free from citrus canker, five years after the 
regional reference body recognized Northwest Argentina as disease-free.  As a result of 
recognition being granted, Argentina drew up a Work Plan for the export of fresh 
lemons, oranges and grapefruit.  However, the Member never approved the Work Plan 




Mexico’s submission highlights the administrative delays countries often face.   
The Mexican Ministry of Agriculture embarked on a plan to establish fruit fly-free areas 
or areas of low prevalence with the objective of obtaining recognition from the US.  Fruit 
affected included apples, grapefruit, apricots, oranges, peaches, plums, persimmons, 
pomegranates and mandarins.  Up until October of 2003, Mexico had requested the US 
recognize additional pest free areas six times.  Although the Mexican government 
followed the same guideline for establishing and declaring all fruit fly-free zones, all of 
these cases took at least two and a half to five years from the time Mexico made the 
request to the US before obtaining recognition (WTO, 2003i).   
 
United States Submission 
 
The US has faced considerable criticism for failing to fairly recognize others’ 
disease-free areas.  As such, the US submission to the SPS Committee focuses on this.  
                                                 
29 The seven major beef importers are Canada, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, the European Union and 
the U.S.  The European Union and Russia accept fresh meat from Brazil.  Other countries, for example 
the United States, import large quantities of beef that has been processed, killing the FMD virus and 
nearly eliminating any chance of disease spread.  
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Regulations were first created in 1987 by the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to allow importation of 
fruits and vegetables from definite areas or districts.  This was in response to Mexican 
lobbying.  Further regulations and amendments were published in 1997.  Similar to the 
EU, one of the most important factors is the credibility of the authorizing authority in the 
exporting country.  Other factors the US considers include risk assessments, evaluation 
of veterinary or phytosanitary infrastructure in exporting region, risk management 
options in the country, and availability of scientific information (WTO, 2004f).   
 
Proposals for Improving Implementation of Article 6 
 
Submissions to the SPS Committee stressed the frequency of countries 
successfully creating disease-free areas within their national borders only to face 
significant delays in obtaining recognition by their trading partners.  Currently, there are 
no extensive guidelines or rules that countries must follow for recognizing 
regionalization.  This creates significant opportunity for protectionist-motivated 
administrative delays.  The proper implementation of regionalization depends on a 
number of factors, all of which can vary significantly and affect how regionalization 
should be implemented.  The technical complexity makes it impossible to create 
ironclad regulations that do not allow for the use of any discretion on the part of the 
responsible government agency.  However, it is possible to ensure rules are in place to 
reduce the ability of governments to apply rules in a discretionary manner and to make 
import regulations more predictable and transparent.  Comprehensive discussions of 
regionalization that began in 2003 have centred on this issue and how to best create 
rules and procedures to promote a reasonable balance between the benefits of 
enhanced trade and the increased risk of potential costs due to a disease spreading.  
Unfortunately, little progress has been made despite being on the agenda of every SPS 
Committee meeting since 2003.  A summary of issues raised and countries’ positions is 
provided below and details of the submissions made to the SPS Committee and 
progress in the negotiations are provided in Appendix C.   
 
Chile has been one of the most active participants in discussions on how to 
improve the implementation of Article 6.  Chile strongly supports creating significantly 
more detailed guidelines to prevent what it perceives to be very serious delays in the 
recognition process.  Chile has highlighted a number of factors which could be the 
cause of delays in an attempt to properly address them.  Some of these are the 
responsibility of the exporting party, such as quality and timeliness of information 
provided or lack of adequate channels of communication and some of which are the 
responsibility of the importing country, such as lack of transparency in information 
procedures, requests for irrelevant information, and lack of harmony in procedures 
(WTO, 2003a).  Chile has repeatedly made calls for a set procedure to be agreed upon, 
with possible timeframes given to some or all of the steps that are to be followed.  Many 
countries, for example Peru, Argentina, China, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Uruguay, and to a lesser degree, the European Union, strongly support this position and 
have made numerous submissions with various alternatives.  These submissions vary  
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mostly in ambition level and were not substantially divergent in overall purpose (WTO, 
2005f).   
 
While a large number of countries support the idea of creating rules within the 
SPS committee to improve implementation of Article 6, others, primarily Canada, the 
United States, New Zealand, and Japan feel work should not occur at the WTO but be 
left to the relevant international standard setting bodies (the OIE and IPPC).  In addition, 
Australia proposes that no efforts should be taken at the SPS Committee until the OIE 
and IPPC have had time to review the issues, possibly establish new guidelines and 
report back to the Committee.  Canada was the first country to formally espouse this 
position in a submission prior to the March 2004 meeting.  Canada reminds Members 
that Article 12 of the SPS Agreement encourages the SPS Committee to maintain close 
contact with the relevant organizations to ensure that unnecessary duplication of effort 
is avoided.  Canada stated that as such, the SPS Committee shall urge the OIE to 
continue, as appropriate, to draw up guidelines on animal health and inform the 
Committee of their activities. Canada espoused that the role of the SPS Committee 
should be to facilitate information exchange by collecting and disseminating information 
from countries regarding their experiences with a view to developing best practices.   
Canada, and the countries supporting this position, argued that as regionalization was a 
technical issue, it was best dealt with by the OIE.  They also suggested it was not 
feasible to create general guidelines with timelines due to the differences in specific 
diseases and pests as well as in regulatory systems of countries (WTO, 2004l). 
 
There are several core issues that have been the centre of discussion at the SPS 
Committee.  Firstly, there are no administrative procedures in the form of an 
international standard or guideline for recognition of disease-free areas.  This includes 
the lack of defined time limits for responses.  There is, however, no agreement on 
where these standards and guidelines should be created, the WTO or OIE.  Peru 
suggested it was necessary to differentiate between the procedures and time frames 
that are required for disease-free areas to be established and declared (which would be 
governed by the OIE) and the procedures and time frames required for the evaluation 
and recognition of disease-free areas by an importing Member (which they argue should 
be created by the SPS Committee) (WTO, 2004a).  Secondly, Members are concerned 
about the limited utilization of official recognition by the OIE.  This is because the OIE 
carries out evaluations and grants recognition of sanitary status for only four diseases
30, 
but some importing Members do not automatically or speedily accept such recognition.  
Several Members have proposed that additional important diseases should be included, 
for example, avian flu, and that a special, expedited process should be created for 
importing countries to accept regionalization claims that have already been supported 
by the OIE.  Finally, Members are concerned about the uncertainty involved in obtaining 
and maintaining disease-free status.  This is a result of many factors including that 
administrative procedures required by importing Members can lack transparency, be 
complex, expensive, slow, and not always clearly defined, there are currently no clearly 
defined time limits for responses, the time taken to recognize an area can vary from a 
                                                 
30 Currently the OIE provides verifications only for foot and mouth disease, bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE), rinderpest and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia.  
  19
 
few months to several years and, finally, administrative procedures between Member 
lack consistency (WTO, 2004e).   
 
A number of key issues have continued to be reiterated by a variety of countries.  
The US stresses the importance of the strength and credibility of authorities responsible 
for animal health in the exporting region and that regionalization decisions must be 
made in an open and transparent manner (WTO, 2004f).  China suggested that all 
Members should publish their own recognition agencies, standards, procedures and 
estimated time period for each step and notify them to Members through the Secretariat 
to improve predictability.  Chile stated that when importing countries chose to apply a 
higher level of protection with stricter admission requirements than the international 
norms, these countries should have to justify that situation or propose changes within 
the OIE if there is a firm scientific basis for such a change (WTO, 2004b).   
 
Despite a lack of process at the SPS Committee, there is a general consensus 
that more detailed guidelines regarding regionalization need to be created.  Where there 
is not consensus, however, is determining where those guidelines should be created 
and their scope.  Some members, primarily the Latin American countries, have strongly 
pushed for detailed rules to be created in the WTO SPS Committee.  The 
representatives from those countries view the greatest deficiency in the rules that 
currently exist is a lack of administrative guidelines which leads to reduced transparency 
and predictability.  They recognize the OIE is the optimal body for determining technical 
regulations and want to encourage continuing work in that arena but they are concerned 
that any improvements in technical regulations will be ineffective without improved 
administration guidelines.  Other countries, such as the US and Canada, advocate that 
work should be completed at the OIE.  These countries believe that there is a very close 
connection between technical procedures and appropriate administrative procedures 
and, thus, administrative procedures would be best determined by the international 
body that has the greatest technical expertise in the area.  They also state that they are 
concerned that work at the SPS Committee would be a duplication of effort and could 
particularly harm small developing countries that have limited veterinary capacity to 
dedicate to these negotiations.  It may be possible that these countries are also 
reluctant to create the administrative rules at the WTO, which would result in them being 
subject to the WTO’s binding dispute settlement procedure.  Politicians have tended to 
act in a more precautionary manner than necessary to cater to public perception that 
everything possible must be done to protect human and animal health in the country 
(Loppacher and Kerr, 2005).  While constraining governments’ ability to act in an 
arbitrary manner is one of the fundamental principles of participation in the WTO, 
politicians may be reluctant to relinquish this control in matters that are perceived by the 
public to impact human or animal health.  The wrangling over procedures and efficacy 
of measures suggests that there is a deep suspicion that the activities of foreign disease 
control authorities cannot be trusted to ensure the disease-free status of a sub-regional 
area.  While there may be honest competency questions regarding science-based 
disease control institutions in some countries, there is seldom a problem in recognizing 
the national competency of these same authorities.  In other words, the same 
authorities that can declare a national level disease-free status cannot be trusted to  
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declare a sub-national area disease-free.  This suggests that it must be difficult to 
achieve and maintain regional disease eradication, and may also imply that the 
incentives to smuggle have not been effectively dealt with.
31  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  i t  i s  
unlikely that regulation alone will ever provide the degree of assurance required by 
importers.  This needs to be formally recognized and put on the agenda to break the 
logjam that currently effects the negotiations. 
 
Considering the stalemate that arisen between countries regarding where 
administrative guidelines should be created, either at the SPS Committee or the OIE, it 
is important to examine what has been attempted and accomplished at the OIE.  Even 
without a clear mandate from the SPS Committee, the OIE has been undertaking work 
on this issue.  The following section examines this work.       
 
Work at the OIE 
 
At the 73
rd Annual General Session of the OIE held on 22-27 May 2005, the OIE 
responded to requests from the WTO to further the work on regionalization by adopting 
a new chapter
32 in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code that specifically deals with zoning 
and compartmentalisation
33.  The OIE states that the procedures in the Chapter are 
best implemented by trading partners before a disease outbreak.  Chapter 1.3.5 notes 
the benefits of zoning to encourage more efficient use of resources within certain parts 
of a country to allow trade in certain commodities from the zone and states that the 
procedures needed will vary according the mixture of circumstances present.  It states 
the limits of the zones can be based on natural, artificial or legal boundaries so long as 
animals and herds belonging to the subpopulation can be clearly recognized as such 
(which highlights the importance of a national identification program).    There is no 
single sequence of steps which must be followed in defining a zone but the 
recommended steps were provided.  These steps are a very general procedure to follow 
and the only mention of time frames is that after an importing country makes a 
determination regarding if it will accept the exporting country’s regionalization effort, it 
should notify the exporting country within a “reasonable period of time” (OIE, 2005c).  
Greater detail is provided in Appendix D. 
 
These newly created guidelines do little to provide the types of administrative 
guidelines that many countries are looking for.  Although a very vague sequence of 
steps is provided in the newly adopted Chapter, it is worded as a mere possible 
procedure to follow, not anything that countries must follow and is so vague as to have 
little consequential impact.  The issues raised by a number of countries in the SPS 
Committee meeting regarding the absence of extensive guidelines for obtaining 
                                                 
31 Unless the intent by importers is simple protectionism – allowing producers in their country the 
opportunity to capture area a in Figure 1 
32 The entire text of the Chapter can be found online on the OIE’s website at 
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_1.3.5.htm 
33 For the purposes of the Terrestrial Code, zoning and compartmentalisation are procedures 
implemented by a country with a view to define subpopulations of different animal health status within its 
territory for the purpose of disease control and/or international trade.  Zoning is when the subpopulation is 
based on geography and compartmentalisation is based on management systems related to biosecurity.    
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recognition of disease-free regions once they are established have not been addressed, 
and again, there is no mention of incentives to smuggle.
34  If administrative disease 
control measures are not foolproof, removing incentives to cheat seems to be the most 
logical way to increase their efficacy. Admittedly, this is not in the usual purview of 
science-based organizations like the OIE.   
 
US Requirements for Recognizing a Disease-Free Region 
 
As Canada’s largest trading partner and single largest destination for exports of 
animal and animal products, the regulations of the US are of paramount importance for 
Canada’s trade in these products.  These regulations are created by the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).  
The APHIS rules have 11 factors which they consider when completing a risk 
assessment on a sub-national zone relating to: the capabilities of the certifying authority 
and diagnostic laboratories; the disease status of the zone in question and surrounding 
zones and the barriers between these zones (including movement controls); animal 
management practices such as active disease controls, vaccination, demographics and 
marketing practices; and the policies and infrastructure for animal disease control in the 
region (Scott Wolfe JDG Consulting Group, 2004).  These are all science-based criteria.  
 
Exporters’ experiences with obtaining recognition from APHIS have been mixed.  
Brazil, for example, has been granted permission to export only processed meat from 
certain recognized FMD free regions.  This processing is usually thermal processing, 
which destroys any traces of the FMD virus that may be present in the meat.  While 
other countries, such as the EU, accept fresh beef from certain regions in Brazil, the US 
does not (Ag News Brazil, 2005).  As discussed above, Mexico has worked diligently to 
expand the regions recognized by the US as fruit fly-free areas.  Administrative delays 
have been significant as each of the six requests before October 2003 took at least two 
and a half years to obtain recognition (WTO, 2003i).  Canada has had success in 
exporting from non-diseased regions of the country to the United States when there 
have been contained disease outbreaks in certain areas, particularly with the avian flu 
outbreaks in British Columbia. In the most recent outbreak in November of 2005, the US 
initially closed the border only to birds from British Columbia.  After it was determined 
the strain found in the infected birds was the low pathogenic variety and information was 
provided regarding the measures Canada took to contain the disease, the US reduced 
the restriction to cover only a 5 km zone surrounding the premise where the outbreak 
occurred (APHIS, 2005). 
 
By making their risk evaluation criteria for regionalized risk assessments public, 
the US has equipped countries to design their systems ex ante to comply with US 
standards.  Obtaining recognition of disease-free areas from the US is often one of the 
primary objectives of countries that are designing and implementing zoning strategies, 
including Canada.  While Canada knows it must primarily adhere to all OIE standards if 
a region is to be declared disease-free, in work completed so far, it has been very 
cognizant of specific criteria the US uses and has worked to incorporate these into the 
                                                 
34 Although this may be contained under the risk assessment umbrella.  
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strategies it is developing.  Canada is also aware of the importance of reciprocity and 
has worked with the US to recognize its regionalization efforts.   
 
Canada and Zoning Thus Far 
 
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), which is responsible for animal 
health in Canada, generally strives for national eradication of diseases and thus, does 
not utilize regionalization extensively.  Canada desires to use zoning as a 'fallback' 
strategy.  Ideally, the CFIA would like to achieve disease-free status on a national basis 
but, should this fail, would create zones to both control the outbreak and regain the 
ability to export from the majority of the country.  Canada has utilized zoning in the past 
and has also recognized other countries’ efforts at regionalization, especially the US.  
Canada applied the zoning principle as a disease management tool with bluetongue in 
the Okanogan Valley in British Columbia, brucellosis in the 1980s, and avian flu in 
British Columbia.   
 
Canadian Recognition of Other’s Regionalization Efforts 
 
Canada has recognized the regionalization efforts of several exporters to allow 
them to access to the Canadian market despite existence of a disease in the country.  
Canada has recognized certain US states as free from avian flu for poultry and 
pseudorabies in swine, allowing imports from these states.  Canada also recognizes the 
Mexican state of Sonora as free from Classical Swine Fever.  The most significant 
regionalization program between the US and Canada was for feeder cattle with respect 
to anaplasmosis brucellosis and bluetongue which began in 1997.  Canada is 
recognized as free from both these diseases while the US is not.  The northwestern 
states pushed for negotiations to eliminate the requirement for individual animal testing 
for these diseases which was economically prohibitive for large scale importation of 
animals destined for slaughter.  An agreement was reached to allow cattle from 
Montana and Washington to move into Alberta and Saskatchewan during October to 
March.  Full access was not granted as these cattle were designated as “restricted 
feeders”.  Restricted feeders could be imported for the purpose of feeding but only into 
approved feedlots where they were placed in segregated pens and given antibiotic 
treatment on arrival.  During the first year of the program, fewer than 1,000 head of 
cattle were imported under the Northwest Cattle Project as producers struggled to 
comply with the restrictions placed on the movement of cattle after their importation.  
Practical application of the requirements to import US cattle proved to be more onerous 
and costly than anticipated by the Canadian feedlot industry.  Cattlemen on both sides 
of the border began complaining that the program as implemented was not workable 
(Annand, 2001).  In 1998, the program was expanded and the name was changed to 
the Restricted Feeder Cattle Import Program (RFCIP).  It was extended to include 
Hawaii, North Dakota and Idaho and removed or relaxed many of the requirements of 
the original program, especially after the antibacterial treatment was completed.  While 
the program was viewed as a success for both sides, it still imposes significant 
administrative costs on Canadian importers, partially dampening enthusiasm for 
importing feeder cattle from the US (Annand, 2001).  The onerous paperwork that had  
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to accompany these imports may have been sufficient to ensure producers followed all 
conditions of the cattle’s importation, but one suspects at least small numbers of cattle 
have not been handled in complete accordance with the regulations established.  There 
is, however, no evidence publicly available to either support or refute this statement.   
 
Canada has not recognized some successful zoning initiatives in certain 
countries.  For example, the OIE recognized the zone south of the 42° parallel in 
Argentina as an FMD-free zone where vaccination is not practiced (OIE, 2005b).   
However, the CFIA states “the country is not recognized free of FMD”.  Processed meat 
can be imported as the processing kills any FMD virus that may be present in the meat 
but no fresh meat can be imported from Argentina, including from the zone the OIE has 
recognized as FMD-free (CFIA, 2004).      
 
Regionalization Within Canada 
 
Serious examination of the possibility of creating animal disease zones within 
Canada began in approximately 2000.  The CFIA has completed two major reports on 
the topic (CFIA, 2001 and CFIA, 2002).  Efforts have focused on the possibility of a foot 
and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak, which Canada is recognized as being free of.  FMD 
is an OIE List A disease, meaning it is highly contagious and has significant economic 
impact.  Estimated costs of a small scale FMD outbreak under optimistic conditions 
would be $13.7 billion and a large scale outbreak would cost Canada $45.9 billion.  This 
is many times the losses that have been experienced in the wake of BSE which has 
been estimated to be about $6 billion.  An effective zoning policy was estimated to 
reduce these costs by up to 45 percent or up to $20.7 billion (Serecon Management 
Consulting, 2002).  A multiple stakeholder advisory group called the Canadian Animal 
Health Coalition (CAHC) has been at the forefront of Canadian regionalization efforts 
thus far.  The CAHC members recognize the economic benefits regionalization may 
provide, but also want to avoid unnecessary inter-provincial or other domestic trade 
barriers (CFIA, 2001). 
 
The approach − pre-outbreak or post − Canada should take is the subject of 
considerable debate.  In a pre-outbreak situation, domestic trade could be constrained 
and lead to additional unnecessary costs to the industry but could result in improved 
control mechanisms and could be proven effective to trading partners a priori.  In the 
event of a disease outbreak, exports from the disease-free area will likely be disrupted 
much less and normal export resumed in a shorter period of time.  If a post-outbreak 
strategy was employed, domestic trade would not have to be constrained when 
unnecessary but trading partners may question if Canada possessed sufficient 
knowledge and experience with regards to industry demographics, surveillance, 
identification, and movement controls.  As such, recognition of disease-free areas 
cleared for export may take significantly longer (CFIA, 2001).   
 
In a study by the CFIA in 2001, a number of deficiencies were noted that would 
impede Canada’s ability to successfully implement zoning.  Some of the deficiencies 
noted were: lack of national retrospective traceability for all susceptible species, lack of  
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continuous movement controls and vehicle disinfection at the boundary of the zone, lack 
of self-containment within the zone for the entire production cycle of each susceptible 
species, and meeting OIE surveillance standards within the zone.  A system of 
retrospective traceability would have developmental costs of about $100 million, 
movement controls at the perimeter were expected to cost about $10 million a year, and 
surveillance for all separately husbanded, susceptible species were expected to cost 
about $1 million per zone.   
 
Early detection of a disease outbreak is one of the most critical components if a 
disease is to be zoned.  The CFIA recognizes that regional disease detection and 
investigation systems will need to be strengthened if Canada is to rely on passive 
disease surveillance as their early warning system for the presence of disease.  One 
tool Canada will be able to utilize is the four brand inspection services in British 
Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba – designed to curtail horse and cattle 
rustling.  Each of these organizations stated they believed they were capable of 
providing the destination of all cattle sold out of the province for the three weeks prior to 
a disease outbreak within a three day turnaround.  This could be critical when trying to 
claim a disease has been contained to a certain region.  Self-containment within the 
zone also presents significant challenges to the Canadian industry (CFIA, 2001).  As 
was discovered after the US border closure because of BSE, Canada has insufficient 
slaughter capacity in the cattle industry, a problem that would be compounded the 
smaller the disease-free zones became. The industry also learned that modifying the 
location of members of the supply chain can take a very long time.   
 
The CFIA attempted to quantify the economic benefits of zoning but due to the 
wide variety and uncertainty of potential disease outbreaks and management, they state 
it is very hard to quantify the economic benefits of zoning.  A large number of estimates 
were made using different assumptions and many of the estimated benefits ranged from 
millions to billions of dollars.  In addition, zoning could have significant social well-being 
implications, for example, lower stress on farmers and the negative impacts that it can 
have on their mental and physical wellbeing (CFIA, 2001).  The CFIA makes reference 
to the issue of compensation for those negatively impacted by a disease only in regards 
to animals that are destroyed as part of the disease control program.  Incentives to 
prevent circumvention of their administrative measures must be an important factor in 
the efficacy their proposed programs. 
 
Lessons from Other Countries 
 
In the fall of 2003, a delegation of 17 representatives from Canadian industry and 
government travelled to the Netherlands, Belgium and the European Union on a zoning 
fact-finding mission to try to learn from their experience.  The mission was part of the 
overall Canadian Animal Health Emergency Management (CAHEM) Zoning Project.   
The project’s objective was to create a workable plan for implementing a zoning 
strategy in Canada.  The delegation learned a number of key lessons and insights that 
were highlighted in the mission report including (CAHC, 2003):  
  25
 
•  For zoning to be effective in the long run, it must be accompanied by livestock 
identification, traceability and a system of movement controls. 
•  Zoning systems must be continually modified and improved.   
•  The human resources needed to support the active zone are significant and 
industry partnering is critical.   
•  Zones must be established before there is a disease outbreak to create 
workable plans and to reduce uncertainty.  If pre-outbreak rules are too tough, 
however, industry will balk at them and not support the initiative.  In addition, 
regulations must be simple enough to assure compliance. 
•  Farmers did not have a very positive view of the bureaucracy involved and 
Canadian participants were very concerned over the paper trail required. 
•  Rumours of outbreak will cause premature movement which could be 
minimized by a clear communication plan (CAHC, 2003). 
 
Where Would Optimal Zone Limits be in Canada? 
 
After examination of Canada’s existing veterinary infrastructure and legislation, 
the CFIA determined the political boundaries of the provinces would likely be the most 
reasonable delimitation of zones in Canada.  There have been several geographical 
situations identified that may allow further subdivisions to be possible, for example, 
Vancouver Island, Cape Breton Island or the lower peninsula of Ontario.  In addition, 
there are some circumstances where it may be more advantageous to group provinces 
or parts of provinces together as one zone, for example, the area east of the Rocky 
Mountains combining with Alberta to make a zone or the three prairie provinces creating 
one zone.  When implementing a zoning strategy, strict movement controls are 
required, especially for OIE List A diseases
35.  As the number of points that could be 
used to cross between zones
36 (and thus, must have control mechanisms) increases, so 
too does the cost of implementing a zoning strategy.  The following table provides the 
number of primary and secondary roads crossing provincial boundaries in Canada 
(CFIA, 2001). 
 
Table 1 Approximate Number of Interprovincial Primary and Secondary Crossings 
 
BC-AB  AB-SK  SK-MB MB-ON ON-QC QC-Atlantic 
7  20 12 1  18 10 
Source: CFIA, 2001 
 
As one can see in the table, there is only a single road crossing from Manitoba to 
Ontario.  The town of West Hawk Lake, on the Manitoba side of the border, is closest to 
                                                 
35 OIE List A diseases are diseases which are very rapidly spread with serious socioeconomic or public 
health consequences.  The list includes, inter alia, African Swine Fever, Avian Influenza, Foot and Mouth 
Disease, Newcastle Disease and Rinderpest. 
36 This discussion assumes movement is due to human involvement, for example, a producer shipping 
their cattle herd to slaughter.  It is not valid for animal movement that occurs naturally, for example, wild 
bird migration.    
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this crossing.  West Hawk Lake (WHL) was identified by the CFIA as the best place to 
implement a zoning boundary in Canada. 
 
West Hawk Lake 
 
There are a number of characteristics which make WHL a good potential site for 
a control point in implementing a zoning boundary.  The primary reason was that it is 
the only crossing between the East and West, as mentioned above, and most livestock 
movement between the possible zones use this road.  WHL would become a stationary 
point where all animal movements are recorded.  This data, along with animal 
identification, would allow tracking and tracing of animal and product movement 
between the zones.  During outbreak periods, the role of WHL would be analogous to 
an international border, prohibiting or tightly controlling movement of products into the 
disease-free zone so as to maintain its status.  The estimated net present value of start-
up costs and annual operational costs of WHL is approximately $19.1 million while net 
benefit over the next 20 years was estimated to be between $5 billion and $20 billion 
depending on the magnitude and characteristics of a disease outbreak.  As such, 
Canada has chosen to move forward on this initiative and is currently in a pilot test 
phase
37 (Scott Wolfe JDG Consulting Group, 2004).   
 
Other Potential Zone Borders Examined 
 
Canada has also examined other potential zoning borders that could be utilized.  
The key criteria they consider are the natural physical boundaries, the potential for 
easily collecting animal and animal product movement data, the potential for easily 
enforcing operations at the border, existing, or potential for, inspection stations, meeting 
OIE guidelines and requirements, meeting APHIS requirements, and the magnitude of 
economic benefits possible.  They examined creating zones encompassing Prince 
Edward Island, the Maritimes, Quebec and Ontario, Saskatchewan, Vancouver Island 
and British Columbia to determine if they were both feasible and economical.  Zoning 
Prince Edward Island, the Maritimes and Vancouver Island was determined to be 
possible but that economic benefits may be limited.  Zoning Quebec and Ontario was 
viewed as having high economic benefits but very high operational costs as well but that 
these costs may be justified.  While zoning Saskatchewan was determined to have 
substantial economic benefits, it was viewed to be not very feasible to implement.   
Finally, zoning British Columbia was assessed as having both moderate costs and 
benefits (Scott Wolfe JDG Consulting Group, 2004). 
 
In the work that has been completed thus far, efforts have focused almost 
entirely on creating control points at zone borders.  However, as discussed earlier, 
history suggests if there is an economic incentive to smuggle, despite the best control 
plans, some smuggling is likely to occur.  While the CFIA plans to create a control point 
at WHL are a good first step, without policies to remove the incentive to smuggle from 
the infected region to the non-infected region, smugglers will almost certainly discover 
                                                 
37 For a full descriptions on the rational and proposed operational details of WHL, see Scott Wolfe JDG 
Consulting Group, 2004  
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deficiencies that they can exploit.  Even if these deficiencies are very limited and very 
little smuggling takes place, with a highly contagious disease like FMD, it would only 
take one infected animal to spread the disease to the previously disease-free area and 
lose the benefits of regionalization.  Hence, compensation is an essential co-requisite to 
administrative measures.  The compensation plan must be decided on before an 
outbreak occurs and clearly communicated to the industry to relieve fears in the event of 
a rumour circulating about a disease outbreak.  Without a guarantee that their livelihood 
will be safeguarded regardless of the discovery of a disease within a zone, producers 
may rush to move animals or animal products out of the infected zone which could 




The ability to create sub-national disease-free zones can provide significant 
economic benefits for an agricultural exporting nation such as Canada.  In addition, the 
economic incentives created by the ability to export from certain regions of a country 
can encourage governments and industry to undertake substantially improved disease 
management practices including eradication and reporting.  The World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
created in 1995 established rules which stated that importing Members should 
recognize the disease status of an area which may be all of a country, part of a country, 
or all or parts of several countries.  While this Agreement has been in place for ten 
years, countries continue to experience difficulties in obtaining recognition of disease-
free areas from their trading partners.  Many of the concerns raised were by the 
European Union and Southern American countries with respect to foot and mouth 
disease.  The SPS Committee has been examining this issue in earnest continually 
since 2003.  Discussions have primarily centred on whether or not the SPS Committee 
should create administrative guidelines to improve implementation of the regionalization 
article of the SPS Agreement.  Many developing countries, the most active of which is 
Chile, propose that technical guidelines should be created in the OIE and administrative 
guidelines should be created by the SPS Committee, as the main problems with 
obtaining recognition have not been on technical grounds but on administrative 
procedures.  Canada stated that it felt that the SPS Committee should not develop 
guidelines as this was the expertise of the OIE and work done at the SPS Committee 
would simply be duplication of effort, a proposal supported by several Members, 
including the US.  During the May 2005 General Session of the OIE, a new chapter on 
regionalization was adopted by the OIE Members.  The new chapter obligates countries 
to carry out a risk assessment when assessing a trading partner’s request for 
recognition of a disease-free area, in addition to proposing a possible sequence of 
events that could be followed.  Members are not, however, required to follow the 
procedure suggested.  This new chapter will likely change little with respect to the 
administrative delays countries face when attempting to have a disease-free area 
recognized by their trading partners.  In almost all of the submissions to the SPS 
Committee regarding Member’s experience with regionalization, Members highlighted a 
number of examples where disease-free status was obtained (and in some cases 
recognized by the OIE), but continued to face significant delays in being granted  
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recognition by their trading partners.  These delays can be extremely costly for industry 
in the exporting country and can be captured by protectionist interests in the importing 
country to slow the process down so that they may enjoy higher prices in their home 
market.  Canada has experienced this first-hand after the discovery of BSE in the 
national herd, facing significant administrative delays to be recognized by the US as a 
‘minimal risk country’, resulting in a prohibition of live cattle exports for almost two 
years.   
 
The WTO SPS Committee has a major role to play in helping to increase the 
transparency and consistency of the application of the regionalization chapter.  The 
WTO’s expertise is not in creating scientific guidelines, which is precisely why it defers 
to international scientific organizations.  What the WTO is highly adept at is controlling 
the use of administrative procedures that can, or are, being used as illegitimate barriers 
to trade.  The OIE has responded to calls from the SPS Committee to develop new and 
relevant guidelines for declaring a region disease-free.  These rules, however, are 
scientific guidelines, not administrative guidelines, and are not capable of ensuring that 
once a country has made the investment to create a disease-free area, it will be 
recognized by its trading partners.  Exporting Members would be significantly better off 
if there were transparent and predictable procedures they knew their trading partners 
were obligated to follow.  Concerns of Canada and other Members that work on 
regionalization at the SPS Committee would be duplication of effort with work done at 
the OIE are failing to realize that so long as the mandate was administrative guidelines, 
this work would be complimentary to the work done at the OIE, not overlapping.  The 
point is underlined by the recent apparent unwillingness of the OIE to step up to the 
request to provide such administrative guidelines. It would be in Canada’s best interest 
to have these guidelines and as such, they should encourage their development and 
play an active role in their formation to ensure that obtaining recognition from trading 
partners is as expedient and predictable as possible, while still ensuring animal and 
human health is protected to the necessary degree.   
 
Canada has been undertaking serious work to advance their capabilities in 
regionalization since 2000 and have made significant progress during that time.  As a 
net exporter of many animal products and live animals, the economic benefits from 
zoning could be as high as $20 billion for Canada in the event of a wide-spread 
outbreak of foot and mouth disease.  Similar gains might be expected from 
regionalization in plant protection. While Canada does not currently have a zone border 
in place in the livestock industry, it is in the pilot project phase for West Hawk Lake 
which would see the creation of one zone comprising everything west of the Manitoba-
Ontario border and one zone comprising everything east of the Manitoba-Ontario 
border. While this geographic bottleneck may well be the most efficient place to control 
smuggling when large incentives are involved, it points out the cost of having to rely on 
administrative measures.  In essence, Canada would be divided into only two markets.  
There is no scientific disease management basis for this division.  It might well be that 
without incentives to smuggle the disease could be isolated relatively easily, for 
example, in a small area of Saskatchewan.  The number of producers negatively 
impacted could be small. Having all of Western Canada excluded from exporting greatly  
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increases the economic losses associated with the outbreak and the size of the 
inevitable compensation, no matter how it is paid.
38 While significant examination has 
gone into the development of plans of how this zone border would work, especially in 
the time period immediately following discovery of a disease outbreak (Scott Wolfe JDG 
Consulting Group, 2004), it seems to be a “second best” solution.  There has been little 
work on creating strategies that will reduce the incentives to smuggle that are created 
when zones have differing disease status and ability to export which results in a price 
differential between the markets.  These need to be developed before an outbreak 
occurs so they are ready to be implemented quickly, preventing smuggling from 
occurring at the very onset of an outbreak. 
 
As an export dependent sector, stakeholders in the various agricultural 
commodities that rely on exports need to continually ask the “what if?” questions and 
have programs and policies in place to address these contingencies.  Canada did not 
give sufficient consideration to the possibility of discovering BSE within its national herd, 
creating a crisis which they were not only ill equipped to handle, but was also worsened 
by the unforgiving standard they previously imposed on all other countries that had ever 
discovered a case of BSE (Loppacher and Kerr, 2005).   The lessons of being 
unprepared are fresh in the beef industry’s mind, as well as throughout the broader 
agricultural sector and thus, should assist in securing the necessary resources to 
ensure agriculture is prepared for the next potential disease outbreak.   
 
Canada has significantly advanced its preparedness to implement regionalization 
in the last five years.  This could be a great benefit to the Canadian industry as control 
plans have been established and could be implemented quickly, limiting the spread of 
the disease.  Obtaining recognition from trading partners, particularly the US, may take 
time after the outbreak as Canada will have to prove the safeguards they have put in 
place to maintain the disease-free zone are working as intended.  Canada will benefit 
significantly if there are more concrete standards created at the WTO establishing the 
procedure importing countries must follow in accepting or rejecting Canada’s request for 
recognition of their disease-free area.  Canada must continue working to develop their 
own systems to create disease-free zones, create and communicate a compensation 
package before an outbreak occurs to prevent smuggling, provide reciprocal treatment 
to our trading partners that can demonstrate the safety of their products and support the 
                                                 
38Further, a significant limitation of WHL is the fact that 80 percent of the cattle population is in the 
western zone while almost 70 percent of the human population is in the eastern zone.  If a disease 
outbreak occurs in the western zone, zoning will have done little to protect Canada’s export market as 
there would be little capacity to export from the eastern region and the majority of the industry could be 
worse off.  This is because if a disease outbreak occurs in the west, they could lose not only their access 
to international markets but also to 70 percent of the domestic consumers as well.  This is not to say that 
without a formal regionalization program in place there would be free and unfettered access to other 
regions of the country as movement controls would still be needed to control the disease outbreak.  If this 
occurred, industry members in the west will not be supportive of regionalization and significant economic 
incentives to cheat will have been created.  Compensation packages will be required if the movement 
restrictions are to be honored.  As discussed in the economic model above, additional delimitation of 
zones will result in greater economic benefits as the area facing export restrictions becomes smaller.    
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ongoing work occurring at the WTO SPS Committee and the OIE to further the 
international agreements with respect to regionalization.  
 
Beyond these initiatives, it seems that the issue of economic incentives needs to 
be formally added to the international agenda.  The analysis in this paper suggests that 
it is an essential co-requisite to strengthening administrative measures.  Neither can be 
fully effective without the other.  It appears that putting in place the SPS Agreement and 
the formal recognition of the Codex, OIE, and IPPC as the standards setting 
organizations with the laudable ambition of having a science-based, rather than 
arbitrary, trade regime for SPS issues, has in this case led to an exclusive focus on 
science-based administrative measures.  As a result, important economic facets of 
disease control on a sub-national basis are perhaps being ignored. The summary of 
SPS, OIE, and national submissions to those bodies provided in this paper and the 
appendices serve to illustrate the exclusive focus on administrative measures. There is 
no mention anywhere of the economic aspects of disease control. 
 
Unless the economic aspects of disease control can be incorporated into the 
SPS, initiatives to strengthen administrative controls domestically will not bear fruit.  It 
seems clear that some WTO Member States that are active at the SPS understand that 
exclusive reliance on administrative measures can never ensure a sufficient level of 
confidence in a sub-national region’s disease-free status.  How else can one explain the 
apparently endless negotiations?  While those involved may not be able to articulate 
their concerns, the existence of economic incentives to cheat must be an important 
factor.  Thus, it seems that questions of economic incentives and how to deal with them 
need to be an integral part of the negotiations.  It is clear that much more research will 
be needed on the design of compensation schemes, although some basic principles 
have been outlined in this paper, as well as research into the resource trade offs that 
will be involved in the interaction between economic incentives and administrative 
measures.  The first step, however, is to recognize the importance of economic 
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Appendix A: Economic Incentives to Conceal Disease Outbreaks 
 
International reaction to announcements of a disease outbreak and the trade 
restrictions that follow can create incentives to conceal a domestic outbreak due to fears 
of losing access to export markets.  After the severe economic losses following the 
discovery of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada, the industry began 
to speculate that they would have been better off had the disease been covered up.  
Alberta’s Premier Ralph Klein stated, “I guess any self-respecting rancher would have 
shot, shovelled and shut up, but he didn’t do that” (as reported by CBC, 2003).  While 
the frustrations that leads to this attitude toward the management of diseases is 
understandable, the problem with this type of approach is that, on the contrary, risk 
communication is an absolutely critical component to the efficient management of risks.  
For example, in the case of BSE, after the agency responsible for food safety in 
Canada, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), became aware of the presence 
of BSE in the domestic herd, new safeguards were implemented to reduce the risk of 
spreading BSE to humans by banning the parts of cattle that carries the infective agent 
from the human food supply.  If producers conceal a disease outbreak because of the 
economic impacts, valuable opportunities for proper management of the disease may 
be foregone.   
 
When facing the threat of market disruption and significant economic losses from 
international applications of SPS measures after the discovery of a disease in the 
national herd, exporters must make a strategic choice.  The exporter can chose an 
‘honest’ strategy and reveal the presence of the disease.  This will likely result in 
“temporary”
39 trade disruptions until disease-free status can be regained
40.  In addition, 
if the importing country believes the exporting country has the proper incentives and 
safeguards in place to protect human and animal health, they are more likely to ban 
only the animals, meat and by-products that pose a risk of spreading the disease
41.  
Proper management of the disease will likely mean domestic consumers retain their 
confidence in the institutions put in place to protect them and will not lose confidence in 
their domestic food supply so domestic demand is unaffected.  Instead, the exporter 
could choose a ‘cheat’ strategy and attempt to conceal the outbreak.   If the exporter 
chooses to cheat, the impact on producer welfare in the country will depend on whether 
or not the cheating is discovered and if the disease spreads.  If it is not discovered, 
producer surplus will be maximized as there will be no adverse trade effect.  If, 
                                                 
39 The amount of time that must pass before market access can be expected to be restored varies widely 
depending on the characteristics of the disease.  For example, a country can regain disease-free status 
with respect to rinderpest after 21 days without an outbreak if it employs ‘stamping out’ practices but it 
takes seven years without a case of BSE to be considered BSE free (CFIA, 2003). 
40 Even if country does not have disease-free status with respect to a particular disease, the animals 
affected and their meat and by-products may be able to be exported.  Conditions, however, are usually 
imposed and these conditions will not be removed until disease-free status is regained.   
41 Using the example of BSE again, many countries banned all exports of live cattle and beef following 
Canada’s announcement even though some products carry almost no risk of spreading the disease.  The 
excellent relationship Canada has with the US allowed Canada to resume exports of boneless meat in 




however, the cheating is discovered, major and long term border closures will likely 
result.  Importing countries will lose confidence in the veterinary service of the exporting 
country and even after the disease outbreak is brought under control, importers will be 
less likely to trust that the disease is in fact eradicated.  Hence, it will likely take a much 
longer time to reopen the border because trust will have to be re-established first.   
Confidence in the relevant regulatory agency was frequently cited as one of the most 
important considerations of exporters’ claims of disease-free areas, whether national or 
sub-national.  In addition, domestic consumers may lose confidence in the safety of the 
domestic food supply so domestic demand could decrease, further depressing prices.  
Regardless of whether the cheating is detected or not, sizeable economic losses could 
occur to both the exporting and importing countries if the cheating results in the 
unchecked spread of the disease.  A decision tree is provided below to illustrate.   
 
 
The actions of the exporter will depend on several factors.  Firstly, as the 
probability of cheating being detected increases, the incentive to cheat will decrease.  
Secondly, the dynamics of the disease in question will affect the incentive to cheat.  As 
the possibility of disease spread and the economic losses associated with that disease 
spread increases, again, the incentive to cheat will decrease.  Also, if failing to reveal 
the disease is viewed to have a negative impact on human health, the incentive to cheat 
will decrease. Finally, the decision of the exporter will depend on how the producer 








Temporary and moderate trade disruption 
No trade effect 
Increased possibility of disease spread 
Long term and severe trade effect 
Decreased domestic demand 
Increased possibility of disease spread 
Figure 1 Mapping outcomes and the incentive to cheat  
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decrease in producer surplus after the discovery of a disease in the domestic herd may 
well be smaller than if exports from the entire country are affected.  The smaller the 
‘temporary and moderate’ expected trade disruption is after the announcement of a 
disease, the less likely it is that the exporter will risk facing the long term, severe trade 
effect combined with decreased domestic demand and increased possibility of disease 
spread.  Thus, the incentive to conceal a disease outbreak is lessened through 
regionalization.     
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Appendix B: Member’s Experience with Regionalization 
 
European Union Submissions 
 
Regionalization is an important risk management tool utilized in the EU.  When 
the EU saw the completion of the Internal Market in 1992, all border controls, including 
veterinary and phytosanitary checks, were abolished.  There is significant variance 
among Member States in the EU pertaining to their animal health situations arising from 
a number of factors including ecological conditions, geographic barriers and historical 
disease control mechanisms.  As such, the application of SPS measures based solely 
on national borders or on the EU as a whole would not be appropriate and thus 
regionalization is utilized.  Although the concept of regionalization had been present in 
the EU SPS legislation long before the establishment of the internal market, after the 
border controls were abolished, the policy was reinforced and extended to cover all the 
pests and diseases of major concern.  In the case of animal diseases, the EU applies 
this concept for FMD, classical swine fever, avian influenza, Aujeszky’s disease and 
Infectious Bovine Rhinotracheitis (IBR).  Depending on the characteristics of the 
disease, the EU may require the creation of buffer zones that partially restrict trade in 
areas that separate infected areas and areas that trade freely (WTO, 2003j).  In a 
submission to the SPS Committee, the EC stated, 
 
We consider regionalization for infected regions as the 
application of strict controls to a country or part of a country 
where a disease exists, in order to control and eradicate it 
while preventing the spread to other areas, thus permitting 
free movement of animals and products outside the affected 
areas, irrespective of the country’s borders and without risk of 
extension of the disease to other areas.  
(WTO, 1998) 
 
The EU believes a risk assessment should be conducted to identify the risk present in a 
zone or region to determine the appropriate SPS measures to utilize to protect human 
and animal health.  The EU outlines a number of elements that should be considered in 
the risk assessment but states that that the primary element to be taken into 
consideration is the competency of the certifying authority involved.  When applying 
regionalization in the EU, geographical features, vector studies, meteorological 
conditions, epidemiological data and administrative boundaries are used to define a 
region.  The EU Food and Veterinary office carries out inspection missions to check on 
implementation by member States.  Monitoring inside and outside the area must be 
carried out routinely (WTO, 1998 G/SPS/GEN/101).   Regionalization was an important 
control technique in the FMD epidemic in 2001.  After cases were discovered, the 
region surrounding the outbreak would be prohibited from exporting any live animals, 
fresh meat and meat products, milk and milk products and other animal products.  This 
allowed trade between unaffected member States and with third countries to continue 
unaffected.  As the epidemic was brought under control, disease-free areas were slowly 
expanded as the disease situation would allow.  The EU states regionalization provided  
  40
 
a focus for targeted measures in areas affected by the disease but allowed disease 
control and prevention strategies to be gradually repealed without impacting areas that 
were already free of FMD.  It allowed trade to resume in a much shorter time period 
than would have otherwise have been possible (WTO, 2003j). While not mentioned in 
this science-based submission, compensation for producers affected by FMD was 
apparently sufficient to remove the incentive to smuggle.  
 
The EU states that it places a high priority on having external trade partners 
recognize their regionalization and is willing to recognize regionalization in other trading 
partners’ territory.  The EU has brought a number of concerns to the SPS Committee 
regarding “unjustified” import restrictions.  Some of the issues they raised included 
import restrictions on exports from Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands due to highly 
pathogenic avian influenza although they had regained their disease-free status in 
November 2003, restrictions on exports from France, Italy and Spain due to classical 
swine fever and restrictions on exports from anywhere in the EU because of foot and 
mouth disease despite the fact all States were officially free of FMD.  They stated that 
the EU continued to recognize areas as being disease-free in several WTO Members’ 
territory when these Members failed to recognize regionalization in the EU.  The EU 
continues to promise to provide all necessary information to demonstrate its disease-
free status to any WTO Member (WTO, 2005e).  Countries for which the EU had 
applied regionalization up to the end of 2003 include Argentina, Australia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Columbia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, South Africa, Turkey, United 
States and Venezuela on diseases such as FMD, bluetongue, classical swine fever, 
African Horse sickness, Newcastle disease, dourine, Venezuelan equine 
encephalomyelitis and general health conditions for horses (WTO, 2003j). 
 
South American Submissions 
Argentina Submissions   
The most significant animal health problem faced by Argentina is foot and mouth 
disease.  The National Foot-and-Mouth Disease Eradication Plan was started in April 
2001 with the objective of eradicating FMD from Argentina and to move toward the 
creation of subregional blocs which could be internationally recognized as FMD-free 
areas.  A number of policy measures accompanied the plan such as establishing 
regions, controlling the movement of animals and animal products, creating information 
systems and managing the vaccination program.  One region south of the Río Negro 
and the Province of Neuquen has been declared FMD-free where vaccination is not 
practiced
42.  The entire bovine population is vaccinated in all other areas.  A variety of 
surveillance strategies have been implemented.  There are now 61 markets open to 
                                                 
42 Vaccination is an important component of preventing FMD in regions where complete eradication is 
unlikely.  As such, the OIE recognizes two types of regions: FMD-free where vaccination is not practiced 
and FMD-free where vaccination is practiced.  The distinction is made because additional safeguards 
must be undertaken in the region that practices vaccination to ensure the animals have not come in 
contact with the FMD virus as the vaccination prevents infection and clinical signs from developing but the 
animals could spread it to non-vaccinated animals.  
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bovine meat from regions in Argentina.  Argentina has welcomed the inspection by 
international experts from the EU, the US, Chile, Russia, Thailand, Philippines, 
Morocco, Ecuador, Venezuela, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil (WTO, 2003e).   
 
Argentina also submitted information that is very illustrative of the types of 
problems exporters encounter when attempting to utilize regionalization.  Argentina 
declared provinces in Northwest Argentina as free from citrus canker, a plant pest.   
Argentina entered negotiations with one WTO Member (which was not identified) to 
obtain recognition of the different status for the disease-free region versus the region 
affected by the disease.  A large amount of information was exchanged to facilitate this 
process and even though this Member has modified its import requirements twice, it 
always recognized the different status of the regions concerned and did not disrupt the 
flow of goods.  However, with a different unidentified Member, despite efforts beginning 
in 1995, Argentina was not able to export to the Member.  In 1999 the Member 
recognized Northwest Argentina as free from citrus canker, five years after the regional 
reference body recognized Northwest Argentina as disease-free.  As a result of 
recognition being granted, Argentina drew up a Work Plan for the export of fresh 
lemons, oranges and grapefruit.  However, the Member never approved the Work Plan 
and trade did not occur (WTO, 2003f).   
Colombia Submissions 
Colombia has also struggled significantly with FMD within its borders.  Colombia 
first had a zone recognized by the OIE as FMD-free without vaccination in 1997 and this 
status has since been renewed annually.  In May 2001, 2003 and 2005 additional zones 
were recognized by the OIE as FMD-free with vaccination.  There is one zone in the 
center of the country that is classified as the endemic zone.  The last outbreak occurred 
in February 2005, 29 months after the last confirmed outbreak (OIE, 2005a).   
Approximately 50 percent of Colombia’s bovine population is located in the zones 
recognized as being FMD free which makes up about 24 percent of the total land area 
of the country.  Colombia has established 58 control points that are strategically located 
in accordance with the epidemiological status of the zones, movement patterns and 
productions systems.  These control points ensure compliance with established 
standards (WTO, 2004g).    
Paraguay Submissions 
Paraguay is officially recognized by the OIE as a FMD-free country with 
vaccination.  Programs to control FMD were created in the 1960s and following their 
success, programs to eradicate FMD were established in 1992.  Paraguay first received 
OIE recognition as FMD-free with vaccination in 1997.  The vaccination program was 
terminated in 1999 in the hopes of obtaining recognition as FMD free without 
vaccination.  However, disease outbreaks in Argentina and Brazil in 2000 in provinces 
bordering Paraguay necessitated the reimplementation of vaccination.  In September of 
2002, a Brazilian vet called by a Brazilian rancher whose property straddled the 
Brazil/Paraguay border found a FMD suspect animal on the Paraguay side.  Brazil and 
Argentina immediately banned all exports of Paraguayan meat and animal products.   
As a landlocked country with no access to the sea, the inability to transport through  
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these countries meant a virtual blockade of their agricultural exports until an agreement 
was reached at the beginning of November with the Argentinean government which 
allowed Paraguay to export products that posed no risk of transmitting FMD to third 
countries.  Regionalization was utilized to isolate the affected area from areas 
authorized to export to its most important export market, the EU (WTO, 2002).    
Peru Submissions 
Similar to the other South American countries whose concerns at the SPS 
Committee have already been highlighted, Peru’s most significant animal health 
problem is FMD.  As of August 1, 2003, 93 percent of Peruvian territory, accounting for 
83 percent of Peru’s bovine population is a zone recognized as FMD-free without 
vaccination.  Peru was able to achieve this by adapting a Regulation on the Control and 
Eradication of Foot-and-Mouth Disease.  As part of this plan, Peru upgraded, expanded 
and refined their epidemiological surveillance system.  In addition, Peru created and 
implemented intensive and systematic vaccinations in border areas considered to be at 
high risk and quarantine protection measures for areas that have been declared free of 
the disease (WTO, 2003h).   Peru has also implemented plans for the control and 
eradication of poultry diseases.  One of the primary objectives of the program is to 
obtain recognition of zones free from Newcastle disease and avian influenza so their 
poultry products can gain access to the world’s most demanding markets (WTO, 
2003g).  
Brazil Submissions 
Brazil’s successful regionalization of FMD has allowed it to become the second 
largest producer of beef in the world after the US.  As mentioned above, Brazil has been 
working to control FMD for almost 40 years and adopted the goal of eradication in 1992.  
Their first FMD-free zone was recognized in 1998 which has since grown to the point 
where now about 50 percent of the national territory, 75 percent of all bovine farms and 
84 percent of the bovine population are in FMD-free zones.  Brazil utilizes large buffer 
zones based on natural and geographical barriers, official quarantine and animal 
movement control and a vaccination coverage of about 95 percent of the country’s 
cattle population to maintain their FMD-free zones.  Using exports of fresh bovine meat 
as an example, Brazil found a direct correlation between the enlargement of the FMD-
free zone and the increase in the number of importing countries.  Brazil has moved from 
36 importing countries accepting Brazilian exports at the end of 1998 to 109 countries in 
2005.  A significantly contentious issue for Brazil is, however, that only two of the seven 
major bovine fresh meat importers buy from Brazil
43.  In addition, even the two countries 
that are open to Brazilian fresh meat exports apply trade restrictions related to FMD.  In 
their submission, Brazil states, “one can draw the conclusion that the most important 
restriction for Brazil’s exports of fresh bovine meat is still the lack of recognition of 
Brazil’s FMD-free zones, established in accordance with OIE standards” (WTO, 2005a). 
 
                                                 
43 The seven major beef importers are Canada, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, the European Union and 
the U.S.  The European Union and Russia accept fresh meat from Brazil.  Other countries, for example 
the United States, import large quantities of beef that has been processed, killing the FMD virus and 





Mexico’s submission focused on their efforts to establish fruit fly-free areas.  The 
Mexican Ministry of Agriculture plan was to eradicate the pest in regions where the 
ecological conditions allowed and reduce the population density in the others.   
Recognition by the US is Mexico’s primary goal as the vast majority of Mexican exports 
are destined for the US.  This recognition allows Mexico to export products which host 
the pest such as apples, apricots, grapefruit, oranges, peaches, plums, persimmons, 
pomegranates and mandarins.  Up until October of 2003, Mexico had requested the US 
recognize additional pest free areas six times.  All of these cases took at least two and a 
half to five years from the time Mexico made the request to the US to obtaining 
recognition (WTO, 2003i).  Given that the Mexican government follows the same 
guidelines for establishing and declaring all fruit fly-free zones before requesting 
recognition from the US, a minimum delay of two and a half years after repeating the 
process six times suggests administrative delays are very significant. 
 
United States Submission 
 
The US submission to the SPS Committee focuses on accepting other Member’s 
requests to have a region recognized as disease or pest free.  The United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
amended its regulations in 1987 to establish criteria under which importation of fruits 
and vegetables from definite areas or districts would be allowed.  This was a result of 
lobbying from the Mexican government.  APHIS published a statement in 1997 setting 
out its policy regarding recognition of animal disease freedom on the basis of areas 
defined by factors other than national borders.  A significant factor for the US in 
recognizing regionalization is the credibility of the veterinary service in the exporting 
country.  Other factors the US considers include risk assessments, evaluation of 
veterinary or phytosanitary infrastructure in exporting region, risk management options 
in the country and availability of scientific information (WTO, 2004f).  In the 2004 Trade 
Policy Review of the United States, the EU asked the United States for the reasons for 
the “continuing lack of U.S. recognition of the principle of regionalization, as 
incorporated in the WTO SPS Agreement, in cases of the outbreak of an animal 
disease” (WTO, 2004m).  The US responded by highlighting an example where APHIS 
had recognized regionalization in Europe with respect to animal diseases.  The US has 
recognized Austria, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, the Netherlands, and certain regions of 
Germany and Italy as free of Classical Swine Fever (WTO, 2004m). 
 
All reference information in Appendix B is available in the 





Appendix C: Chronology of Negotiations on Regionalization at the SPS 
Committee 
 
The implementation of Article 6 was identified by the Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee) as an issue that required further work during 
the First Review of the SPS Agreement in 1999 and it has been an agenda item of 
every single meeting of the Committee of the WTO since 2003.  While all countries are 
officially supportive of the basic principles of creating sub-national zones in a country 
according to the disease status of the area, exporting countries often experience great 
difficulty in getting sub-national zones recognized by trading partners.  Discussions on 
regionalization have centred on this topic.  In the 1999 review, the SPS Committee 
noted that “recognition of pest or disease-free areas or areas of low pest or disease 
prevalence could facilitate trade in agricultural products” but that “Members faced 
difficulties in implementing the Article” (WTO, 2004i).  Some of the issues that caused 
difficulty for Members included excessively lengthy administrative processes for official 
recognition of a region from which exports would be accepted by importing countries, 
divergences in interpretation and implementation of international guidelines, and the 
complexities involved in risk assessment.  Discussion of these problems appears to 
have resolved little.  The Second Review of the SPS Agreement completed in 2005 
stated exporting countries still suffered from delayed recognition of their pest- or 
disease-free status by importing countries and that procedural issues were still a major 
impediment (WTO, 2005d).  The following details the progress of the discussions.   
 
Negotiations and Proposals in 2003 
 
Chile has been one of the most active participants in discussions on how to 
improve the implementation of Article 6.  In preparation for the April 2003 meeting of the 
SPS Committee, Chile raised several concerns regarding delayed recognition of 
disease-free zones.  Firstly, the OIE grants official recognition of disease-free areas but 
many importing countries do not automatically accept these.  Secondly, administrative 
procedures required by importing countries are usually very complex, slow and differ 
from those established by the OIE.  Chile made several suggestions for improvement.  
Chile believed work needed to be done to clarify the valid procedure to be followed.  
Although importing countries do not automatically adopt OIE verifications, they felt the 
OIE should verify other important diseases
44.   Finally, Chile suggested work should be 
done on reviewing the corresponding standards in order for all countries to be able to 
raise any doubts, so as to update standards that are adopted without difficulties about 
subsequent application (WTO, 2003c).  
 
Chile submitted additional information to stimulate discussion for the meeting in 
April 2003.  In an attempt to remove delays in the recognition procedure, Chile identified 
a number of factors which can cause delays.  The reasons identified were: 
• Information  quality 
•  Timeliness of the information 
                                                 
44 Currently the OIE provides verifications for only foot and mouth disease, bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE), rinderpest and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia.  
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•  Flexibility in the analysis process 
•  Lack of adequate channels of communication 
•  Lack of transparency in information procedures 
•  Asymmetry in technical and operational capacity 
•  Requests for irrelevant information (protectionism, technical capacity) 
•  Lack of harmony in procedures 
•  Lack of technical and operational resources at national level to address the 
number of requests effectively (WTO, 2003a) 
 
Chile proposed a procedure that could be adopted by the SPS Committee to help 
reduce ambiguity to facilitate quicker recognition.  They recognize that each of these 
stages would require close cooperation between the importing and exporting countries 
to be able to achieve an adequate level of protection.  Chile recommended that audits 
and verifications are conducted to ensure countries are performing the actions they 
promised.  This procedure is as follows: 
•  Requirement of an official request, usually by the competent national health 
authority (plant health or veterinary service, depending on the case);  
•  Request for information, often using questionnaires on the organizational and 
operational aspects of the veterinary or phytosanitary services, epidemiology, 
surveillance, quarantine systems and programmes dealing with emergencies 
and health warnings;   
•  Analysis of the information and evaluation of the sufficiency thereof;   
•  Visit to the area in question, if deemed necessary, for on-site verification of 
the information received;  
•  Technical analysis;  
•  Adaptation of procedures on a bilateral basis;  
•  Issuance of an acceptance or rejection report. 
•  Making the report available for public consultation at the national level;   
•  Issuance of the legal instrument recognizing the free area. (WTO, 2003a)   
 
Later that year, Mexico submitted a document which stated they supported 
Chile’s suggestions and made additional recommendations.  Mexico’s suggestions for 
procedures generally followed the Chilean model but included recommended time 
frames.  For example, after an exporting country submits a written request for 
recognition along with a technical file substantiating their claim, an importing country 
should have to submit whatever comments it considers relevant or suggest a date for 
officials to inspect the area or region in question within a maximum of two months.   
Mexico also stated that exporting parties shall be responsible for financing such 
inspection visits (WTO, 2003b). 
 
At the October 2003 SPS Committee meeting, Chile submitted a proposal of a 
Draft Decision on the Implementation of Article 6 of the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.  The Draft Decision contained a number of 
noteworthy provisions.  Firstly, it reaffirmed that transparency, exchange of information 
and the promotion of confidence and credibility among trading partners was essential to 
the recognition of SPS status among Members.  Secondly, it stated that the application  
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of the “principle of regionalization” provides an effective way to ensure trade 
opportunities are not wasted.  As such, it proposed some of the following: 
•  SPS recognition shall not require the drafting of a formal agreement. 
•  Importing Members shall explain the requirements and stages involved in 
obtaining recognition of SPS status with respect to a given disease. 
•  Importing countries shall respond as quickly as possible to requests from 
exporting Members for recognition of regionalization (not to exceed two 
months). 
•  The exporting Member shall provide information to support its demonstration 
of SPS status including, inter alia, reference to relevant international 
standards, or relevant risk assessment guaranteeing or largely supporting the 
SPS status of the zone in question. 
•  The importing Member shall not impose demands in excess of those relating 
to the disease in question and shall analyze the information to determine 
whether their SPS measures achieve the adequate level of protection against 
the risk under consideration. 
•  If the importing Member agrees the exporting Member’s efforts are sufficient, 
the importing Member shall ensure its decision to recognize the 
regionalization shall not take more than three months to implement. 
•  If the importing Member rejects the request, they must provide technical 
grounds for its decision so that the exporting Member can modify and adapt 
its system with a view to seek recognition again. 
•  Members shall give full consideration to requests by another Member, 
especially a developing country, for appropriate technical assistance to 
facilitate the implementation of Article 6. 
•  The SPS Committee recognizes the need to continue to develop guidelines 
for the determination of disease-free areas and areas of low disease 
prevalence and shall urge the OIE to continue, as appropriate, to draw up 
guidelines on animal health (WTO, 2003d) 
 
Negotiations and Proposals in 2004 
 
The European Union responded to Chile’s Draft Decision submitted at the 
October 2003 meeting by submitting a very slightly altered version.  The only significant 
changes were to include statement saying that the expenses related to inspections and 
tests to demonstrate a SPS status should not be born by the exporting Member and 
removing the deadline of three months for an importing country to implement a positive 
determination and replacing it with “no later than a deadline to be established” (WTO, 
2004d).  Many delegations supported Chile’s proposal when it was discussed in detail at 
the June 2004 meeting.  They suggested that work was needed both at the technical 
level by the OIE but also trade facilitating guidelines from the SPS Committee.  They 
suggested further work was necessary in the SPS Committee similar to what had 
already been done for equivalence, consistency and transparency (WTO, 2004l). 
 
In preparation for the March 2004 SPS Committee meeting, Canada submitted a 
proposal for a Decision on the Implementation of Article 6 of the Agreement on the  
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Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.  This proposal reaffirmed the 
international obligation to adapt SPS measures only to the extent necessary to protect 
human and animal health.  It also recognized that regionalization is an increasingly 
important issue to trade amongst all countries and that it can be applied between all 
Members, irrespective of their size and development.  The most significant part of the 
proposal was in relation to the division of labour that should occur between the WTO 
SPS Committee and the OIE.  It reminded Members that Article 12 of the SPS 
Agreement encourages the SPS Committee to maintain close contact with the relevant 
organizations in order to ensure that unnecessary duplication of effort is avoided.  As 
such, it stated that the SPS Committee shall urge the OIE to continue, as appropriate, to 
draw up guidelines on animal health.  They shall be invited to regularly inform the SPS 
Committee of their activities.  Members shall provide the SPS Committee with 
information on their experiences with a view to developing best practices (WTO, 2004c).  
In practical terms, Canada was stating that the SPS Committee should only be used to 
facilitate information exchange and not be working to create guidelines for the 
implementation of Article 6 but rather leaving it to the OIE.  When this proposal was 
discussed in greater detail at the Committee meeting, a number of delegations 
supported this proposal.  They noted that regionalization was a technical issue and thus 
was best dealt with by the OIE.  They also suggested it was not feasible to create 
general guidelines with timelines due to the differences in specific diseases and pests 
as well as in regulatory system of countries (WTO, 2004l). 
 
Just after the March 2004 SPS Committee meeting, the US submitted a 
document with its views on regionalization.  The US made several points based on their 
experience with regionalization.  Firstly, any regionalization decision must consider the 
strength and credibility of the authorities responsible for animal health in the exporting 
region.  A key element in establishing confidence in other countries is a Member’s 
timely, consistent and accurate disease reporting as called for by the OIE.  Secondly, 
regionalization must be based on science and a risk assessment that takes into account 
the biology of a particular disease and an evaluation of the veterinary infrastructure in 
the exporting region.  Thirdly, the availability and quality of scientific information will 
dictate to a great extent the length of time and the complexity of the risk assessment.  
Fourthly, regionalization decisions must be reached in an open and transparent manner, 
allowing relevant input from all parties.  Lastly, the US stated work was needed to 
address the situation where a region was previously recognized as free, has had an 
outbreak but has regained its free status.  The US stated that it considers the OIE to be 
the appropriate body to undertake the task of developing guidelines for reaching 
regionalization decisions (WTO, 2004f). 
 
After the June 2004 SPS Committee meeting, Peru submitted a proposal on 
Article 6.  Peru noted that it costs as much if not more to maintain a disease-free status 
as to obtain it and maintenance mainly depends on the degree of commercial benefit 
that the producers gain from the status.  Uncertainty in the recognition of disease-free 
areas puts the sustainability of such areas at risk.  Peru also noted that the principles of 
Article 6 had already been considerably developed by guidelines by the OIE but that the 
administrative procedures required by importing countries are not clearly defined, are  
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very complex, expensive and slow and there are no clearly defined time-limits for 
response.  As such, Peru felt it was necessary to differentiate between the procedures 
and time frames that are required for disease-free areas to be established and declared 
and the procedures and time frames required for the evaluation and recognition of 
disease-free areas by an importing Member.  In the latter case, there must be certainty 
in law as to the administrative procedures to be followed by both the exporting and 
importing country so that recognition can be completed once the status of disease-free 
area has been obtained.  In consideration of this, Peru proposed a number of 
procedures and time frames that should be applied. 
•  Areas internationally recognized by the scientific reference organizations for 
the SPS  Agreement shall be accepted by the Member countries using a 
simplified procedure consisting of a request by the exporting Member 
accompanied by a technical dossier and the decision of the international 
reference organization. 
•  The exporting Member may demand information from the importing Member 
regarding its specific requirements and procedures for recognition of a 
disease-free area with respect to a particular disease. 
•  After an exporting Member makes a request for recognition along with the 
technical dossier used for the national declaration of recognition, they shall 
notify the SPS Committee of the initiation of the process within two months of 
the submission of the request to the importing Member. 
•  The importing Member shall examine the request within a period not 
exceeding three months and within that period inform the exporting Member if 
it needs to carry out an inspection visit to verify information.  Following this, 
the importing Member shall issue an evaluation report. 
•  If the evaluation report contains comments, the exporting Member shall 
respond within two months to provide the relevant clarifications, additions or 
modifications.   
•  If necessary, the importing Member shall carry out an inspection visit and 
within two months of the conclusion of the visit, shall issue the corresponding 
report.  The exporting Member shall respond to the report within two months. 
•  Following the receipt of the exporting Member’s comments, the importing 
Member shall issue its decision approving or rejecting the decision within two 
months.   
•  If it is a favourable decision, the importing Member shall carry out the internal 
administrative changes to eliminate the restrictions and allow exports from the 
Member that requested recognition within three months. 
•  If the decision is unfavourable, the importing Member shall provide the 
technical grounds for its decision to allow the exporting Member a chance to 
make the necessary changes and reapply. 
•  The exporting Member shall notify the SPS Committee of the results (WTO, 
2004a). 
 
In September of 2004, New Zealand made a submission in which they stated 
their concern that despite a large number of proposals made to the Committee, there 
was no clear way forward on the issue of regionalization.  Like Canada, New Zealand  
  49
 
expressed the desire to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort.  The submission 
highlighted some of the concerns that have been raised in discussions at the SPS 
Committee.  They grouped these into three main concerns.  Firstly, there are no 
administrative procedures in the form of an international standard or guideline for 
recognition of disease-free areas.  This includes the lack of defined time limits for 
responses.  Secondly, Members are concerned about the limited utilization of official 
recognition by the OIE.  This is because the OIE carries out evaluations and grants 
recognition of sanitary status for only four diseases and some importing Members do 
not automatically or speedily accept such recognition.  Finally, Members are concerned 
about the uncertainty involved in obtaining and maintaining disease-free status.  This is 
a result of many factors including that administrative procedures required by importing 
Members can lack transparency, be complex, expensive, slow and not always clearly 
defined, there are currently no clearly defined time limits for responses, the time taken 
to recognize an area can vary from a few months to several years and, finally, 
administrative procedures between Member lack consistency.  New Zealand proposed 
that the SPS Committee invite the OIE Secretariat to examine, inter alia, if it would be 
appropriate for them to develop and include administrative procedures within their 
international standards, recommendations or guidelines, the technical feasibility of 
ascribing defined time limits to the consideration of regionalization requests under 
existing international standards, recommendations or guidelines and the process for 
Member acceptance of OIE recognition of disease-free status (WTO, 2004e).  
 
China submitted comments for the Second Review of the Operation and 
Implementation of the SPS Agreement and regionalization was one of four areas of 
concern addressed.  China stated their primary goal is to facilitate reducing the negative 
effect of the SPS measures on international trade through more consistent and effective 
implementation of the SPS Agreement by all Members.  China reiterated the difficulties 
that have been experienced in obtaining recognition from importing Members including 
divergences in interpretation and implementation of international guidelines, an 
excessively lengthy administrative process by importing Members and the complexities 
often involved in risk assessment.  China put forward a number of proposals in order to 
facilitate international trade.  China proposes to take full advantage of the OIE in 
recognizing disease-free areas and areas of low disease prevalence, in order to avoid 
redundant work, reduce disputes, shorten the recognition period and lower costs.  China 
suggested the OIE should expand the diseases which it will declare countries as being 
free from to include, inter alia, highly pathogenic avian influenza, Newcastle disease 
and Swine Fever.  Once certain areas are recognized by the OIE as disease-free, the 
importing Member should not make any additional new requirements for recognition.  
China also states that Members should publish their own recognition agencies, 
standards, procedures and estimated time period for each step and notify them to 
Members through the Secretariat.  This will help the exporting Member to confirm if it 
complies with the requirements for disease-free areas of the importing Member.  China 
also called on developed countries to provide developing countries with as much 
technical assistance and special and differential treatment as possible by, for example, 
exempting developing countries from being responsible for the costs incurred in 
arranging for investigations by the importing county (WTO, 2004k).  
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Chile submitted two documents just before the October 2004 meeting to clarify 
their position and respond to questions from the Chairman of the SPS Committee.   
Chile firmly stated that their aim was to strengthen and in no sense replace or duplicate 
the work of the OIE but fill the need for a framework or guideline for the process of 
recognition that takes place after a country has attained the status of being disease-
free.  Chile wishes to see changes which more clearly define the rights and 
responsibilities in the importer/exporter relationship.  Chile also noted the situation when 
countries’ appropriate level of protection is higher and admission requirements are 
stricter than international norms.  They state that such countries would have to justify 
that situation or propose changes within the OIE if there is a firm scientific basis for such 
a change (WTO, 2004b).  Chile states the role of the SPS Committee should be to 
oversee the application of the principle in such a way as to ensure that international 
standards are observed or that there is just cause for any departure, while preventing 
delays from becoming unjustified barriers to trade while the role of the OIE is to draw up 
technical and scientific guidelines or recommendations regarding appropriate SPS 
measures to apply in different situations.  Chile also states that it is necessary to 
generate greater commitment among Members to recognize the verification process of 
the OIE.  With regards to time frames, Chile states that periods established by the OIE 
for determining when an area is free of a disease should not be subject to discussion, 
since this involves scientific determination.  What Chile thinks should be addressed by 
the SPS Committee is the administrative time frames for recognition of a given sanitary 
status (WTO, 2004h).   
 
In December 2004, Argentina submitted comments for the Review of the 
Operation and Implementation of the SPS Agreement.  Argentina stated that it 
considers the work being done by the OIE not only shows significant and consistent 
progress but also reflects the Members’ concern to make headway in controlling 
diseases.  However, in many cases Members efforts to raise their sanitary status are 
not rewarded by better market access conditions, owing to the difficulty in obtaining due 
recognition by importing Members.  Argentina notes that they have experienced these 
difficulties, in particular the excessively lengthy administrative process.  As such, 
Argentina stated they believed that the SPS Committee should devise a procedure for 
the recognition of disease-free areas including provision for the inclusion of other 
issues, as well as strictly technical and/or scientific ones and establish a general 
framework for addressing trade commitments which is the specific domain of the SPS 
Committee even if it eventually becomes subject to specific OIE technical regulations 
(WTO, 2004j). 
 
Negotiations and Proposals in 2005 
 
In February of 2005, Chile submitted a proposal that it hoped would further the 
discussions concerning regionalization at the SPS Committee.  Chile acknowledged that 
while some Members felt the Committee should be developing guidelines similar to 
those developed for the implementation of the principle of equivalence, certain 
Members were not convinced of the need to develop such guidelines on the grounds 
that there would be problems of duplication with the OIE.  In view of that, they proposed  
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four measures aimed at furthering the discussions while at the same time providing the 
mechanisms to help implement the regionalization principle.  Firstly, all countries should 
fill out the questionnaire sent out by the SPS Committee Chairman on 5 October 2004.  
Chile feels this will reiterate the distinction between the role of the Committee and that 
of the OIE and clarify the work to be done in each case.  The replies will allow countries 
to explain the reasons behind their desire or opposition to creating guidelines in the 
SPS Committee and thus provide a basis for seeking consensus.  Secondly, Members 
should make use of the results of the discussions on this topic at the OIE.  Thirdly, the 
SPS Committee should include a heading in the notification system which information 
would be provided on initiation and termination of processes of recognition of disease-
free areas.  Finally, the agenda of the Committee meetings should include two sub-
items: a) information from Members regarding requests and recognition of sanitary and 
phytosanitary conditions; b) information from the scientific organizations on their 
progress and other elements they wish to discuss with respect to regionalization (WTO, 
2005c). 
 
Just prior to the March 2005 SPS Committee meeting, Australia submitted its 
view on the issue of regionalization.  Australia pointed out that the OIE had a work 
program relating to Article 6 and was working on expanding the chapter relating to 
regionalization.  Australia proposed the SPS Committee invite the OIE to consider and 
advise the Committee on a number of matters such as whether there is a need for the 
OIE to develop general guidelines regarding the implementation of Article 6 to assist 
both exporting and importing Members, how to best ensure a consistent and 
coordinated approach to these matters by the international standard setting bodies (the 
OIE and the IPPC), the role of the OIE in relation to the SPS Committee in addressing 
administrative as well as technical aspects of regionalization in any guidelines on 
regionalization and the technical feasibility of assigning specific time limits to specific 
steps in the process of considering regionalization requests.  Australia recommended 
deferring further consideration of the specific question of whether the Committee should 
develop guidelines for Members on the application of Article 6 until the advice from the 
OIE was received (WTO, 2005b).    
 
An informal meeting specifically on regionalization was held just before the 
March 2005 SPS Committee meeting.  The meeting centred on the submissions from 
Chile and Australia explained above.  Members indicated broad support for the two 
proposals and suggested that a practical solution was to be found in the combination of 
the two proposals.  However, several issues were highlighted during the discussions.  
These included Member’s frustration and impatience with the practical difficulties in 
implementing Article 6, the divergent views over the issue of administrative guidelines 
and criteria and concerns about the role of the OIE and the SPS Committee.  A number 
of Members proposed the Committee work on the elaboration of general administrative 
guidelines but without details on timeframes and procedures.  However, several 
Members stated the Committee should await responses from the OIE to the 
Committee’s questions before proceeding to develop guidelines.  One Member pointed 
out that while the problems the Members experienced with the implementation of Article 
6 appeared to be trade related, the root of the problem was often related to animal  
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health.  The Chairman proposed that: 1) the Committee submit specific questions to the 
OIE based on those in the Australian proposal in time for their meeting in May 2005; 2) 
Members be encouraged to respond to the Chairperson’s questions; 3) the issue of 
regionalization be included as a standing agenda item for Committee meetings; 4) a 
workshop be organized in June to discuss the issues in more depth; and 5) a draft work 
programme, and of the questions to be submitted to the OIE be circulated for 
consideration at the regular meeting of the Committee.  Members were in broad 
agreement with the proposal but some were concerned that the Committee continue to 
address the issue of establishing general administrative guidelines (WTO, 2005f).   
 
Discussions at the March 2005 meeting regarding regionalization centred on the 
draft work program.  The representative from Paraguay felt the work programme 
proposed by the Chair failed to reflect some of the concerns expressed in the informal 
meeting.  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay supported 
the view that the main purpose of the work programme was the elaboration of the 
guidelines and was for Members to discuss how general or how specific the guidelines 
should be.  The representatives of Australia, Canada and the US indicated that they 
could accept a work programme which provided for the “possible” elaboration of general 
guidelines.  While these countries felt the OIE would be best to develop over-arching 
guidelines, they were willing to adopt the proposed work programme in the spirit of 
moving the issue forward but continued to stress the guidelines should be broad and 
general.  The representative of EU had no objections to the drafting of general 
administrative guidelines by the SPS Committee but was concerned that this did not 
result in delays in achieving the practical implementation of Article 6.  Japan stated that 
they could accept the draft work programme with the proposed amendments but 
opposed the inclusion of working on specific time frames and guidelines.  Chile 
responded by stating that their suggestion that the Committee consider the inclusion of 
specific timeframes in any guidelines had been put forward only as a possibility to be 
considered by the Committee, not as a definitive proposal.  The Chairperson concluded 
that there was no consensus in the Committee to adopt the draft work programme 
(WTO, 2005f). 
 
All reference information in Appendix C is available in the 
reference list following the main paper.  
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Appendix D: OIE Newly Adapted Chapter on Regionalization 
 
Chapter 1.3.5 – Zoning and Compartmentalization
45 was adopted at the 73
rd 
Annual General Session of the OIE held on 22-27 May 2005.  The OIE was responding 
to requests from the WTO to further the work on regionalization.  For the purposes of 
the Terrestrial Code, zoning and compartmentalisation are procedures implemented by 
a country with a view to define subpopulations of different animal health status within its 
territory for the purpose of disease control and/or international trade.  Zoning is when 
the subpopulation is based on geography and compartmentalisation is based on 
management systems related to biosecurity.  The OIE states that the procedures in the 
Chapter are best implemented by trading partners before a disease outbreak.  Some of 
the most important provisions of Chapter 1.3.5 – Zoning and Compartmentalisation are 
summarized below: 
 
•  Zoning may encourage the more efficient use of resources within certain parts 
of a country to allow trade in certain commodities from the zone 
•  The procedures used to establish and maintain the distinct health status of 
the zone should be appropriate to the particular circumstances, and will 
depend on the epidemiology of the disease, environmental factors, applicable 
biosecurity measures (including movement controls, use of natural and 
artificial boundaries, commercial management and husbandry practices), and 
surveillance and monitoring. 
•  The extent of a zone and its limits should be established by the Veterinary 
Administration on the basis of natural, artificial or legal boundaries. 
•  Animal and herds belonging to the subpopulation need to be clearly 
recognized as such. 
•  There is no single sequence of steps which must be followed in defining a 
zone but the recommended steps are: 
o  the exporting country identifies an area that could potentially be a zone 
o  the exporting country identifies the procedures which are being used or 
could be used to distinguished the area from other parts of their 
territory 
o  the exporting country makes a request of importing country and 
provides information 
o  the importing country determines if it will accept the area as a zone 
taking to account an evaluation of the exporting country’s veterinary 
service, the result of a risk assessment, its own animal health situation 
with respect to the disease concerned and other relevant OIE 
standards 
o  the importing country notifies the exporting country of its determination 
within a reasonable period of time 
o  attempts should be made to resolve any differences of opinion by 
using an agreed mechanism to reach consensus 
                                                 




o  the importing and exporting country enter into a formal agreement 
defining the zone (OIE, 2005c) 
 
All reference information in Appendix D is available in the 
reference list following the main paper. 
 
 
 